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Preface

Shaky System of Division & the Korean Peninsula at the Crossroads

*Human Beings Existing enclosed within the order of Time and Space*
*The Creators of Time and Space on Earth*

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In the 1990s, the system of division on the Korean Peninsula entered a new phase with the global dismantling of the Cold War structure and the destruction of the balance of power between North and South Korea. North Korea, defensive of its system, and South Korea, with superior power, began to expand and deepen mutual contacts from the mid-1980s in the midst of the collapse of Eastern European socialism and the shock of German unification, culminating in the adoption of the Basic Agreement. However, efforts by North and South Korea to create a system of order, conforming to the post-Cold War era, could not be free from either the intervention of the United States, an outsider as well as an insider in the system of division on the Korean Peninsula, or the system-instability caused by the internal crisis brewing in North Korea. The system of division fluctuated between the disappearing old order and the newly emerging but not fully-grown order, throwing the Korean Peninsula and East Asia into a situation of instability.

The basic characteristics defining the existing 'shaky system of division' lie in the tensions between North Korea and the United States, and the crisis in North Korea. North Korea-US tensions have continued since the armistice signed in 1953. With the deepening of the crisis in North Korea and changes in the US strategy of global supremacy, the situation has escalated to the level of possible military action. In conjunction with the situation, it is necessary to consider changes on two levels. One level being the crisis within North Korea, which has left the leadership with a limited range of policy options and, thus, creating the possibility of the use of drastic methods to resolve the internal crisis. The efforts of the North Korean leadership to develop nuclear weapons and demands for guarantees of non-
aggression towards its system can be interpreted along these lines. On another level, the US strategy of global supremacy is maintained, not only on the basis of non-proliferation, but also has been strengthened along the lines of anti-proliferation and strike-first policies. The US invasion war on Iraq shows how far the US could go in relation to its realpolitik on North Korea.

However, as seen from the tensions between North Korea and the US, and the North Korean internal crisis, the pessimistic aspect of the political trends on the Korean Peninsula cannot be considered as natural consequences arising from the 'basic characteristics' of the so-called '53-system'. The June 2000 North-South Korea Summit and the June 15 Declaration are clear indications of the changes within the North Korean leadership. Post-summit political trends on the Korean Peninsula also showed that inter-Korea relations could heavily influence the changes in the system of division. North Korea and the US released a Joint Communiqué in October 2000, promising to implement the Basic Agreement released in 1994, and called for improvements in relations. Towards the end of the 1990s, North Korea, in the midst of making changes in the economy and foreign relations in an effort to overcome the crisis in its system, undertook steps to improve relations with countries of the European Union, despite the policies of the Bush Administration. Further efforts for economic changes were also carried out. The economic reform measures in July 2002, the opening of Shinjju, Gaesong and Mt. Geum-gang (September to November), the Japan-North Korea Summit in September, are some clear indicators of the intention of the North Korean leadership towards liberalization and reform of their system.

The turbulence in the system of division after the 1990s and the unstable political trends on the Korean Peninsula are indicators that the system of order on the Korean Peninsula is entering into a long-term transition. The global dismantling of the Cold War structure, the crisis within North Korea, the changes in the Chinese economy, the formation of a US-centered single hegemonic order, the external and internal political and economic changes of South Korea, etc, led to a situation where maintaining the '53-system' was becoming impossible. The North Korea-US tensions can be seen as a strategic confrontation centering on the formation of a new order, to replace the old and the outdated. Although not free from the characteristics of anti-proliferation and terror prevention in the policies carried out by the US after 9.11, the tensions between North Korea and the US are important in determining the system of order on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia in the early 21st century. East Asia will be of strategically importance financially and militarily in the 21st century and the Korean Peninsula, centrally situated in East Asia, is a 'system within a system' and remains a decisive factor in the changes in the region. From this perspective, the
settlement of tensions between the US and North Korea is not a simple matter left solely in the hands of the US and North Korea, but must take into consideration the strategic actions of other countries in East Asia, especially South Korea, China and Japan. Furthermore, South Korea is directly subjected to the actions of the US and North Korea, and its interests are also linked to the tensions between both countries.

The ideological and policy-related tensions within South Korean society clearly show the transitional character of the changes in the order on the Korean Peninsula. Such changes include the conflicts between strategies of parallelism VS cohesion on the North Korean nuclear issue, Korean-led strategies VS US-South Korean cooperation, equal US-South Korean relations VS the maintenance of US-South Korean alliance, ‘anti-US sentiments’ VS ‘pro-US sentiments’, strategies of reconciliation and cooperation VS hawkish strategies, anti-Cold war pacifism VS ideological anti-Communism, etc, showing that the changes in the order on the Korean Peninsula are directly reflected in the social awareness of the society. Conflicts within South Korea can be seen as political competition on the direction of changes in the political order on the Korean Peninsula, carried out by different political forces within the society. If this political competition does not develop unexpectedly into a violent aspect, peace on the Korean Peninsula would reach new dimensions.

It is the aim of this report to review the necessary work that needs to be carried out by civil society, especially the peace movement groups, to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula. For this, a review of US foreign policy, which directly influences peace on the Korean Peninsula, is carried out (Chapter One). And also presented are the methods for a peaceful settlement in the midst of tensions between the US and North Korea on the North Korean nuclear issue, the causes for heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula (Chapter Two). With developments in intra-Korean relations, interest on the ways of enhancing economic cooperation is increasing and on the other hand, interest on North Korean human rights is increasing not only in South Korea but also in international society. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with these two topics respectively. The following chapters deal with the analysis of peaceful disarmament, necessary for the establishment of a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. Chapter 5 analyzes the reform of the Korean military and the disarmament movement. Chapter 6 is a critique of the US-South Korean military alliance, central to the disarmament of the Korean Peninsula. Finally, chapters 7 and 8 show the ways in which the new peace movement is emerging in the South Korean society, and also present the aims of the peace and disarmament movement carried out by PSPD.
I would like to express my thanks to the workers of the Center for Peace and Disarmament (PSPD), advisers, and members of the Executive Committee who had helped make this report possible. Finally, my deepest thanks to the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, without whose valuable support, this report would not have been possible.
I. The 'New Rollback' Strategy of the Bush Administration

The aim of this paper is to show the policy shifts of the Bush Administration, from blockade to the policy of 'new rollback' consisting of 'Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI)' and the 'war against terrorism'. The new policy underwent a basic change in character from the previous passive strategy of blockading danger, to a pro-active and aggressive stance of unilateralist and striking first to eliminate danger. The Afghan and Iraqi wars are clear indicators of the character of the 'new rollback' strategy where first-strike actions have led to changes in governments of the two countries. This paper intends to point out that the 'two-war strategy' and the 'mass weapons of destruction Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI)' are targeted toward North Korea and are structural threats to the security of the Korean Peninsula. The progress in the implementation of such US policies on the Korean Peninsula will also be closely examined.

It was predicted that the unilateral policies of the Bush Administration would be globally denounced and opposed, and the Bush Doctrine to rupture in the near future or possibly face difficulties. However, the problem lies in the execution style of the Bush's unilateral polices and not in the contents of the policies per se. Although mentioned toward the end of this paper, despite the irrationality of the unilateral policies of the Bush Administration, the Bush Doctrine received support from numerous countries as it was packaged under the policies of 'war against terrorism' and the 'weapons of mass destruction Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI)' and advanced countries, worried about being challenged by Third World countries, were receptive to both policies. In other words, the Bush Doctrine supported by the US military supremacy, is a double-edged attempt to contain and eliminate potential threatening powers in an unipolar global system and at the same
This paper analyzes step-by-step the process of the 'two-war strategy' and the 'weapons of mass destruction Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI) of the Bush Administration and how the 'rollback strategy' is undertaken on the Korean Peninsula. And finally, how these policies and the 'war against terrorism' are operated and the examination of how these policies have influenced the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

II. `Two-war Strategy' and the Korean Peninsula

1. 'Two-war Strategy'

In the early 1990s, the Administration of George Bush (Senior) pursued positive military reduction with the advent of the post-Cold War era and took into consideration active de-militarization through the withdrawal of short-range nuclear weapons stationed abroad. To counter the military power of the former Soviet Union, there was a total reconsideration of the allocation of military forces. The strategy of 'win-hold-win', i.e., if two regional conflicts occur simultaneously in a strategic area, the military would be concentrated in one region and warfare carried out, while the conflict would only be controlled in the other region. However, once victory became certain in the first region, the military would move to the second region to ensure another military victory. Therefore there was no need to maintain a big military force because victory could be ensured even with a reduced military force. As such, plans to reduce US troops stationed in Asia and Europe were prepared and the three-step reduction plan of the US troops in South Korea was undertaken as part of the global trend of troop reduction.

However in 1993, this strategy of 'win-hold-win' did a turnaround in the 'win-win' 'two-war strategy'. The purpose of this strategy was to be victorious in two different battlefields, namely the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula and was adopted following the Gulf War in 1991 and the North Korean nuclear crisis. The 'two-war strategy' was confirmed in 1991 and 2001 in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and consolidated as part of the US military strategy of the 21st century.

The Bottom-Up Review in 1993 was the first document to formalize the 'two-war strategy'. The 'two-war strategy' was considered to have been formalized based on the then Secretary of Defense Aspen's work on the size of the military force needed to undertake simultaneously similar warfare, taking the number of US troops dispatched during the Gulf War as reference. According to the Bottom-Up Review, "US troops are stationed to ensure simultaneous and decisive victories in two major areas of conflict ... Depending on our choice, US troops must have the flexibility and the
capacity in size and structure to act independently.” Such ‘two-war strategy’ strategy required a bigger military force and budget compared to the ‘win-hold-win’ and after its confirmation by the Bottom-Up Review, all military plans for troop reduction were scrapped. The three-step troop reduction plans of the US military in South Korea did not advance beyond the first stage, and plans to reduce a hundred thousand US troops in Asia and Europe as well as plans for troop reduction in other parts of the world, were scrapped for the same reason.

The US military took one-step further and demanded increases in the military budget and expansion of military power. It was difficult to carry out warfare in two wars and achieve a victory with the existing military forces and for the ‘two-war strategy’ to function, the military must be strengthened. However, the Clinton Administration did not accept the demands of the military and instead concentrated in maintaining the status quo, with partial reinforcement of military forces. Conditions within the US and outside were not receptive for the comparatively moderate Democratic Party to pursue military reinforcement openly. According to the first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published in 1997, the US continued with the ‘two-war strategy’ and promoted research on missile defense partially but there was no big change in the overall military capacity.

In the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published in 2001, 20 days after 9-11, the ‘two-war strategy’ continued as part of the US military policy but took on a more aggressive aspect. That is, “the US military needs to possess the capacity to swiftly repulse attacks on US allies and friendly nations in any two battlefields overlapped in time,” a confirmation that the ‘two-war strategy’ was once again adopted. At the same time, the need for a military force in the advent of warfare, “to be able to invade [the enemy’s] territory and set the conditions for a change in government.” The ‘two-war strategy’ prior to the Bush Administration was in character a blockade policy, fighting with the enemy to normalize the situation within a country. But the new ‘two-war strategy’ is a rollback strategy with the aim of invading the enemy’s territory and putting a new government in place.

But the rollback strategies of the Bush Administration are more aggressive in character than former rollback policies. Former rollback policies were passive, reacting against the first-strike of the enemy and the possible invasion of the enemy territory in the process. Bush’s new rollback policies could blockade any potential security threat even if the enemy does not strike first and so is more aggressive in character. The US government had no choice but to adopt this defensive stance and the efforts to create a ‘safe fortress’. This stance can be rationalized by the increasing sense of threat of potential terrorism that was felt by American citizens after 9-11. Responding after a terrorist attack was considered futile because of the damages already caused and so any possibility of terror must be crushed and any possibility of attack blockaded from the very beginning. According to
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, the “ignorance of any potential attack on the US and possibility of further ignorance of the fact of the ignorance,” must be blockaded to eliminate any potential security threats, and this is based on the paranoiac stance on security. In 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke on the need of pre-emptive strikes in his visit to NATO allies and following Bush's speech to military graduates on the necessity of pre-emptive strikes, the possibility of launching pre-emptive strikes was first formalized in 2002. In the National Security Strategy released in September 2002, on the first anniversary of 9-11, the Bush Administration proclaimed "the US will strike first if the need arises."

2. The Strengthening of Military Capacity in Asia and the Pacific

After the adoption of the 'two-war strategy', the military capacity of the countries near the Korean Peninsula was steadily increased together with that of the countries in the Middle East. The determining factor in the increase of militarization in East Asian countries was the "review of the situation of readiness of the US military in South Korea", carried out toward the later half of 1993 when the North Korean nuclear crisis was becoming an issue. Gary Luck, the commander of the US troops in South Korea in 1993, asserted, "the present military capacity is insufficient to counter the North Korean threat" and formally requested the increase in military capabilities. Accordingly, the Pentagon took steps to increase the firepower of the troops in South Korea by reinforcing 120 M1A1 tanks, Patriot missiles, Apache helicopters, etc. The number of troops stationed remained the same but the mobility of the military in times of crisis was virtually getting expanded.

In 1994, the US Congress approved a budget of US$ 250 million to be spend in increasing the military capacity of US troops in South Korea while at the same time, an agreement was being signed in Geneva freezing the North Korean nuclear program and provisions being made for a light water reactor -a double standard of dialogue and negotiations and the possible use of military force. In 1996, the old reconnaissance OV-10 Mahawk was updated with the Airborne Reconnaissance Low Aircraft. In 1977, the US introduced the latest satellite system to allow for rapid transmission of reconnaissance information with the South Korean military and to strengthen information and reconnaissance abilities. On one hand, Patriot missiles were dispatched in the environs of the US military in South Korea, to increase defensive power against North Korean reprisals and multi-purpose extended-range artillery adequate for immobilizing North Korea's long-range artillery were also introduced.

After the Gulf War, it was analyzed that logistics had been the cause of the 'bottle-neck phenomenon' during 'Operation Desert Shield' and 'Operation Desert Storm' and a 'Mobility Requirement Study' was carried out. According to the proposals of this report, the US had pre-positioned
heavy weaponry in the Indian Ocean and in the fall of 1996, pre-positioned one brigade of tanks, armored cars and communication devices in South Korean waters. And since military capacity was evaluated on the number of troops and situation of bases, this kind of heavy- weaponry pre-positioning was not likely to be considered as increased military capacity. There was no big change in the number of troops stationed in the environs of the Korean Peninsula and so the situation could be considered unchanged. However, the US had been increasing its firepower that could be mobilized in times of crisis, from 1996.

Prior to the pre-positioning of heavy weaponry, from 1994, the RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration into the Combat Force) training was started due to changes in the logistics strategy. The formation of an Interim Brigade Combat Team called the Striker Base by the US-ROK Joint Forces Command and holding of the first military exercise in South Korea, shows the connection with the overall process of the US military's transformation into interim brigade combat teams. The US military in South Korea closed down unnecessary military bases and those that were open to possible security threats, as part of the joint land management plan and re-located its troops to Osan Airbase which was needed for missile defenses and for the interim brigade combat teams. To complete the process, the 2nd Infantry Division would be relocated south of the Han River and the US 8th Army in Yongsan to a new location. The alignment of US bases in the south would be to remove US bases from the range of fire of North Korean long-range artillery and once the re-alignment were completed, US bases would be safe from any missile or long-range artillery threats from North Korea and be free to undertake any military operation. This would be the completion of the execution of the `two-war strategy' started in 1993.

At the same time, the US had assessed the attack and defensive capabilities of the assault landing units stationed at the Sasebo base in Japan and it became known that the US had set up measures for the creation of an expeditionary force. An Aegis destroyer, auxiliary cruiser and a nuclear submarine were reinforced at the base and if the necessity arose, could aim a pre-emptive strike against enemy targets outside the waters of Japan. The US had meticulously prepared for any possible intercontinental ballistic missile attacks from North Korea and by early 2004, a missile defense system would go into operation in Alaska. Assistant Secretary of Defense Aldridge confirmed in a Senate hearing in the spring of 2003, that the possibility of the missile system to shoot down any missiles fired from North Korea was over 90%.

On the other hand, it can be evaluated that South Korea, as the lesser partner in South Korea-US military alliance, had been strengthening its local task performing capabilities. Firstly, it should be pointed out that Operation 5027 of the US-ROK Joint Forces Command, the framework of the South Korean military operations, is the model of application of the `two-war
strategy' on the Korean Peninsula. The beginnings of Operation 5027 go back to the 1980s and the military plan aims to strike the heart of North Korean territory at the start of a war and this aggressive character is fueled by the war-prevention doctrine of the Bush Administration.

Due to such aggressive military plans, attack capabilities of the military are being strengthened as well. The introduction of F-16s to command air supremacy and F-15s to counter air-to-surface missiles are decisive evidence of such changes. The South Korean military are also equipped with the latest M1-A1 and similar K1-A1 tanks and even with the latest Russian T80u tanks and on the pretext of countering North Korean armored vehicles produced in the 1950s, it has been decided that Apache helicopters be reinforced. As can be judged from the mobility of Apache helicopters, this type of military capacity is not passive defense to resist against North Korean threats but is a part of the 'aggressive defense' of Operation 5017.

In addition, plans are underway to introduce ten Hawk 800XPs and a military satellite system to improve information capability. Although nothing is being said about a missile defense system, it is certain that plans for such a system is already underway. Long and mid-term plans to strengthen the military such as the SAM-X missile project to introduce PAC-3 Patriot missiles, the KDX III project to introduce Aegis destroyers and the reinforcement of AWACS, all give the strong impression that these are plans for the consolidation of a missile defense system. Unlike claims that such modernization plans of the South Korean military are needed for an independent military, there exists the possibility that the South Korean military is more deeply immersed as a subunit of the US military. The projects pursued by the South Korean military are part of the bigger picture of US 'two-war strategy'.

The so-called 'state normalization' of Japan must also be understood in the context of the US 'two-war strategy'. Since the formalization of the 'two-war strategy' in 1993 in the Bottom-Up-Review, the US and Japan under mutual cooperation, carried out measures to put this strategy into practice. The US had discovered that Japan was not fully prepared when it had seriously considered attacks on North Korea in 1994 and so in 1995, took concrete measures to counter these problems. In accordance with the 'two-war strategy', if a war would take place on the Korean Peninsula, Japan had to provide support as a rear base and the US realized that the Japanese legal system must be re-consolidated and virtual military capacity be upgraded to meet its goals.

The Japanese government carried out a series of military legislation including the 'National Defense Program Outline' and the 'Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan' (1995), the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security (1996), a treaty to provide support in times of war (1996), the reform of the military guidelines (1997), the Anti-Terrorism Law (2001) and the
emergency legislation (2003). The Japanese government with its intentions of 'state normalization', pushed these legislations for implementation, aided by reasons of internal politics and the 'visible threat' of North Korea which contributed to stirring positive public opinion. The Japanese government was under a lot of pressure from the Americans who were demanding collective self-defense, including the possibility of constitutional reform. The US, to avoid the 1994 precedent, and to implement the 'two-war strategy' on the Korean Peninsula, strongly pressured the Japanese government and the Japanese took advantage of the opportunity. The Bush Administration has been carefully following the proposals set forth in report written by Richard Armitage, the present Deputy Secretary of State, in October 2000. According to the report, "revised Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation should be regarded as the floor not the ceiling for an expanded Japanese role in the alliance. More to the point, it says "Japan's prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation."

Such proposals have become the reality and explain in a nutshell, the Bush Administration policies regarding relations with Japan. Japan has already started a common research program on missile defense and is trying to achieve long range military capabilities. As part of the 'two-war strategy, the US, South Korea and Japan are pursuing stronger military capabilities and at the same time, promoting organic military unity. It appears as if the US-Japan military exercise, 'Keen Sword' and the US-South Korea military exercise 'Foal Eagle' are carried out separately but these exercises are carried out at almost the same time, achieving training from the organic application of the military of the three countries. In 2003, US Marines in Okinawa underwent a rapid reaction force training and their ability to land on the Korean peninsula within 24 hours, was confirmed, part of the process of paving the way for US troops in Japan to be dispatched to the Korean Peninsula if the need arises. It Is certain that the US has been carrying out concrete preparations for the operation of the 'two-war strategy' in regard to the Korean Peninsula.

III. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI) & the Korean Peninsula

The policy of deterrence on weapons of mass destruction, especially of nuclear weapons, the so-called 'balance-of-terror' framework was the basis of the strategy during the Cold War. For the US, showing that it possessed the ability and intention to launch multiple nuclear attacks if it were struck first by an enemy country, was a method of suppressing enemy attacks. If the relations among nuclear states were structured around the 'balance-of-terror' framework through the 'two-war strategy', the relations of non-nuclear states were influenced by the nuclear non-proliferation policy, which
prohibits non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear capability. Concrete measures like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were set up for this very purpose.

However, after September 11, 2000, the policies of deterrence and non-proliferation were subjected to a fundamental review. The 9.11 terrorist attack broke the belief of Americans of the US being a 'safe fortress'. The US realized that it was not easy to control or defend itself from the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction of rogue states nor was it easy to identify the terrorists or their whereabouts. The US could not carry out immediate and basic counterattacks and the most supreme superpower in the world realized that it was exposed to an unexpected and a new type of "strategic weakness." Unable to accept this "strategic weakness", the US with the purpose of eradicating terrorism, took the elimination of weapons of mass destruction of the "Axis of Evil" states as its most pressing security issue, an issue that must be resolved. For the Bush Administration, the methods chosen were through the Nuclear Posture Review and the Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI).

However, what must be clearly clarified here is that North Korea is not only one of the targets for the 'two-war strategy' but is also subjected to the Nuclear Posture Review and the Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI). The fact that North Korea lies in the middle of the crossfire between the 'two-war strategy' and weapons of mass destruction strategy is the most urgent security issue on the Korean Peninsula and East Asia.

1. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)

The changes in the US strategy concerning weapons of mass destruction can be clearly seen in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) adopted in 2001 and released to the press in early 2002. Previous deterrent strategy, 'the Triad', consisted of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range nuclear-armed bombers. A 'New Triad' is established, concentrating on offensive, defensive strike systems and a revitalized defense infrastructure. The deterrent policy, which has been the basis of nuclear strategy in the past 50 years, now comes under the defensive and offensive systems of the 'New Triad'. The Bush Doctrine has opened the way for the possibility of first-strikes and the new nuclear strategy adopted to allow the possible use of nuclear weapons in offensives, can be interpreted as the possibility for nuclear first-strikes. So judging from the overall changes in security strategies, it can be ascertained that the US would deploy the use of nuclear weapons in first-strike offensives.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) published in early 2002 reveals the awareness that previous deterrent polices were insufficient in dealing with the increasing security fears after September 11, 2001. The report took into account the present nuclear capabilities, proposed new guidelines and
defined situations for nuclear weapons use as immediate, potential and unexpected contingencies, with Iraq and North Korea being applied with all three classifications, the so-called "chronic military concerns". The report outlined concrete scenarios for nuclear weapons use on North Korea, clarifying possibilities of a nuclear war with North Korea.

The US is not only considering war scenarios against "chronic military concerns” but is also undertaking plans to carry out the development and research of nuclear weapons. The US is planning to develop new nuclear capabilities to destroy hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT) in countries like North Korea. The development of ‘bunker busters’ is estimated to require 15 million dollars, the new-generation ‘mini nukes’ 6 million dollars, the shortening of the preparation time to re-start underground nuclear testing 25 million dollars, research into environmental evaluation of facilities for manufacturing detonating equipment for existing nuclear weapons plutonium another additional 22 million dollars, which have been requested as part of the 2004 budget, accelerating the development of nuclear capabilities.

In 1994, the US in the Basic Agreement promised a `passive security guarantee', and that it “would not use nuclear weapons or threaten North Korea with the possibility of nuclear weapons use.” The Nuclear Posture Review outlines the need to prepare for nuclear weapons use on 7 countries including North Korea and this is a violation of the Basic Agreement and the ‘passive security guarantee’ given by the US to non-nuclear states through the NPT and the international society.

2. Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI)

Following the release of the Nuclear Posture Review, in December 2002, the Bush Administration announced the 'National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NS-CWMD)'. If the former had been a comprehensive review of the US nuclear strategies and subsequent changes, the latter was to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The former changed the deterrent policy into an offensive approach and the latter passive non-proliferation into aggressive counter-proliferation. That is, just as nuclear weapons could be used to attack in times of crisis as outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review; offensives could be carried out to prohibit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

When the ship carrying North Korean missiles ordered by Yemen, was seized in the Indian Ocean at the end of December 2002, this became the catalyst for the Bush Administration to put the Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI) into operation. The reason for the US violation of international law to seize the ship was due to the adoption of the weapons of mass destruction counter-proliferation strategies in May 2002. According to the White House on December 10, 2002, the day of the seizure of the ship,
interdiction of the ship was an important counter-proliferation tool of the ‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NS-CWMD)’. This paper proposes comprehensive measures of counter-proliferation, non-proliferation and consequence management to counter weapons of mass destruction like nuclear and chemical weapons. To stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction, "the capability to prevent the transfer of materials, technology and experts" must be considered. Such capability known as interdiction in military terms includes shelling and bombardment used to stop the actions of the other party and is a stronger military action than ship seizure or internment. Furthermore, an "aggressive defense" could be adopted "to hinder, default or destroy weapons of mass destruction during the delivery process."

A part of the information on such "defense" was released in May 2002 in the "National Security Presidential Directive No. 17" and the "Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 4". More aggressive information was believed to be included in the undisclosed presidential directives. According to a report by the Washington Post, it is believed that the secret presidential directives contain approvals for "pre-emptive strikes" on countries close to acquiring weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. The formal adoption of the "pre-emptive strikes" is a fundamental and dangerous policy shift from the policy of deterrence during the Cold war when it was just possible to deter war based the attack capability per se.

The Bush Administration has revealed that it has considered a nuclear attack on North Korea in the Nuclear Posture Review. However, unlike the previous "offensive defense" undertaken if the US or any of its allies were attacked as revealed by documents released until recently, this policy shift emphasized a pre-emptive strike even if no enemy military action was involved. "Presidential Directive No. 17" has opened the way for pre-emptive strikes even if an enemy country does not take any military action or any preparations for a strike such as moving its troops. So this is a blunt proclamation of unilateral militarism and any country considered as the enemy could receive attacks for having a missile development program or a nuclear program and the ship seizure incident by the Bush Administration is just the implementation of aggressive counter-proliferation policies.

What is especially worrisome about the secret annexes of presidential directives are the designation of North Korea, Iran, Syria and Libya as the central targets for counter-proliferation policies. And since North Korea has both missile and nuclear programs, it is most likely to be in the forefront of the crossfire among the US policies of "prevention", "aggressive defense" and "pre-emptive strikes". In line with policy shifts in the US military strategies, it is worrisome that the Geneva Basic Agreement, which had frozen the North Korean nuclear program, is being broken and the North Korean missile program thruster forward as an international issue.
More aggressive searches of North Korean ships by the Japanese government can be understood as part of the US counter-proliferation policies. In 2003, the blockade on North Korea reinforced by the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), taking drug trafficking and money counterfeiting as the pretext, was also in lieu with counter-proliferation policies. The US in attempts to create international cooperation on the North Korean blockade, are promoting `DPRK Illicit Activities Initiative' and the `Proliferation Security Initiative' (PSI) on weapons of mass destruction. John Bolton, the US Undersecretary, Arms Control and International Security, in a Senate hearing in 2003, revealed that the US intends to "achieve new ways of hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the sea, air and the land" through these initiatives.

The `DPRK Illicit Activities Initiative' is to prevent North Korea from earning foreign revenues from drug trafficking, money counterfeiting, money laundering and other illegal activities. The seizure of the North Korean ship at Brisbane, Australia, in April, on charges of drug trafficking and stronger inspection of North Korean ships entering Japan, are all part of this initiative. In the same context, Taiwanese authorities took a thorough search of a North Korean ship for technically violating customs procedures and confiscated material that could be used in chemical weapons.

Proliferation Security initiative (PSI) was announced in May 2003 in Krakow, Poland, and 11 countries (US, Britain, Japan, Spain, Germany, France, Australia, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal) are participating. The US held two Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) conferences in Madrid, Spain and Brisbane, Australia in order to consolidate counter-proliferation polices into an international agreement and agency. At the first conference in Madrid in June 2003, three proposals were proposed to hinder illegal exports of materials connected with weapons of mass destruction on board aircraft and ships, to conduct naval and aerial interdiction in territorial waters and airspace, and also sea raids. At the Brisbane Conference in July 2003, John Bolton who represented the US in his position as head of disarmament at the State Department, claimed that "the US possesses the legal right for troops of PSI countries to attack North Korean ships in the sea" and called for the active use of military force to achieve counter-proliferation. PSI participating countries opposed direct attacks on North Korea but took part in the joint civil-military interdiction training exercises in September 2003, still following the US counter-proliferation policies. Prior to the joint military exercises, the 3rd PSI conference was held in Paris and the US called for concrete measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to heighten awareness that military use was inevitable in the seas. The Bush Administration not only remains decisive of the counter-proliferation policies but is also pulling the trigger at North Korea.
IV. The US at the apex of union of ‘nationalism’ & union of advanced countries

In the analysis of the US ‘two-war strategy’ and the weapons of mass destruction counter-proliferation strategy, it was pointed out that North Korea is in the line of crossfire between both strategies. These strategies do not exist only on paper but concretely as increased militarism surrounding the Korean Peninsula and appearing as war threats. The Bush Doctrine is a matter of concern because it could destroy global stability and peace and evoke a crisis on the Korean Peninsula because of its aggressive nature.

One reassuring factor is that the awareness of the dangers of the Bush Doctrine is high on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East and is targeted for opposition but this is not always so in other countries. It is true that the US being at the apex of the unipolar system, in the post-Cold war era and its unilateralist policies had been the target for opposition by the world press and other countries. The hegemonic policies are based on the confidence that the rise of any potential challengers would be completely blockaded, and this evoked disapproval and concern from other countries. However, it must also be taken into account that the ‘war against terrorism’, ‘counter-proliferation strategies’, and the ‘two-war strategy’ reflect the ‘national interests’ of numerous countries in the world.

In Russia and China, Britain and other advanced countries, Eastern Europe and many countries of the Third World, are all exposed to internal ‘terrorist threats’ and so the ‘war against terrorism’ provides them with the opportunity to eliminate their ‘internal enemies’. Challenges by various forces on the authority and rationale of the ‘state’ are crushed militarily, an excellent opportunity to strengthen the status of the ‘state.’ The ‘war against terrorism’ provided the opportunity for the ‘state’ to recover its authority, which has been weakened by the development of communications and transportation, the rise of non-state entities, the acceleration of globalization, etc. The strengthening of such ‘nationalism’ does not distinguish the type of government or the socio-economic position of the state and so is beneficial to interests of numerous countries. The Bush Doctrine is welcomed in most countries as it dominates the efforts of the various forces of civil society to expand the concept of security from national security into human security and allows the ‘state’ to monopolize violence. Russia and China are wary of the unilateralism of the Bush Administration but at the same time; welcome heartily the ‘war against terrorism’ for the reasons aforementioned.

If the ‘war against terrorism’ had provided a framework of getting approval from many countries, the ‘two-war strategy’ and the counter-proliferation policies are attractive policies to advanced nations. The targets of the ‘two wars’ and counter-proliferation policies are countries, which are challenging the global security order although without the military and economic, might of advanced nations. Iraq, Iran, North Korea, etc, are the
`Axis of Evil' states, which oppose being consolidated into the unipolar system with the US at the apex and other advanced nations as supplementary groups, and these are countries that can deploy weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Relations with the `Axis of Evil' countries differ depending on individual countries but one thing that is certain is that the challenges posed by these states are commonly deemed as dangerous. During the Iraqi War, France and Germany led the forefront in opposition, Russia and China oppose the sanctions on North Korea but this has the approval of European countries and so differences exist in the detailed execution process. However, the control or suppression of the `Axis of Evil' states receive silent approval from advanced nations.

The unilateralism in the Bush Doctrine can create temporary and partial barriers in the execution process but the doctrine receives approval for its `anti-terrorism' aspect as well as for its `two wars' and counter-proliferation framework. Superficially, the Bush Administration appears to be at the receiving end of global criticism and resistance but the Bush Doctrine has led to the union of `nationalism' against terrorist groups, isolating the `Axis of Evil' countries and consolidating a union of advanced nations, with the US at the apex of such a union of `nationalism' and union of advanced nations. Such unipolar middle-layered structures are the underlying factor, which provides a stable basis for the Bush Doctrine.

The Bush Doctrine, with its purpose of changing the government in North Korea through pre-emptive strikes and nuclear attacks, has placed the Korean Peninsula in the midst of a war crisis. The existence of the policies of the Bush Administration with its emphasis on the launching of pre-emptive strikes to destroy nuclear weapons and missiles has placed the Korean Peninsula in the whirlwinds of war. There is no need to explain how dangerous such policies are which intend to make the Korean Peninsula into a "sea of fire" regardless of the wishes of the Korean people. It is urgent that the Korean people counter these problems independently and come up with measures to stabilize peace on the Korean Peninsula. The diplomatic capabilities and wisdom of the South Korean government is urgently needed to maintain an independent position, leveraging the US and North Korea to come to a peace resolution of the crisis. An international civil society is needed to pressure the US and North Korea to abandon their nuclear weapons and missiles and go the `way of peace'. The dangers and stability of the Bush Doctrine must be clearly analyzed to lessen the war crisis and proposals for increasing peace must be expanded. 2003 is an important year for determining whether the crisis on the Korean Peninsula be peacefully resolved or aggravated into a crisis of war.
Chapter 2

Peaceful Resolution of the North Korea-U.S. Conflict: South Korean Civil Society Perspective

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1. The Changes in the System of Division and the Crisis in the Korean Peninsula from the North Korea-U.S. Conflict

Changes began to take place in the “system of division” in the Korean peninsula since the mid-1980s, just as there began to appear signs of dissolution in the global Cold War order. While the Cold War order continues to prevail over the Korean peninsula, even after the end to its global version between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., it began to take on comparatively new features.

Firstly, in the southern half of the “system of division”, the success of developmental dictatorship paradoxically spurred on the development of the civil society and the process of democratisation. In the northern half, the failure of the self-reliant development strategy brought about an economic crisis and a de facto demise of the party-state system. The systemic crisis in North Korea contains in it a potential to spiral the whole of the Korean peninsula into a crisis.

Secondly, the “system of division” in the Korean peninsula began to emerge as an independent, small-scale, cold war system, no longer a sub-category of the U.S.-Soviet Union cold war structure. The current conflict between

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1 This presentation attempts to bring the various debates among the peace and reunification movement groups in the civil society in south Korea over the question of how to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict between north Korea and the U.S. into a common proposal. The various analysis, principles, and proposals contained in this paper, therefore, are those that have been developed, presented and circulated by the various groups, activists, and researchers. Some parts of this presentation, especially the section 1 to 5, are modification of author's previous writings. Given the character of the paper, the author has taken a liberty to leave out references, and the author takes this opportunity to seek understanding from those whose contributions are included in this paper. It could not, however, be stressed too strongly that all the responsibility for this paper lies with the author.

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North Korea and the U.S. over the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons development programme has, in the context of the unitary hegemonic system under the Aegis of the U.S. contains a potential for the eruption of a military tension and armed confrontation.

Thirdly, since the mid-1980s, with the gradual diffusion of the political significance of the systems competition, the contacts on the level of the governments in south and North Korea gained momentum. The progress in the development of relationship between south and North Korea emerged as the central dynamism propelling the changes in the cold war system that lay over the Korean peninsula.

The inter-Korea summit in June 2000, that gripped the attention of the people in south and North Korea, was the paramount historical event that demonstrated the changes taking place in the “division system”. The three major changes indicate the process of the unravelling of the cold war order in the Korean peninsula, but at the same time, testify the existence of the factors of uncertainty and instability, continuing to operate in different forms.

At the heart of the small-scale cold war system that arches over the Korean peninsula in the post-cold war period lies the conflict between the U.S. and north Korea. The new focal point came into shape in the midst of the progress in the relationship between south and North Korea, with major landmarks like the adoption of a basic agreement between south and North Korea in 1991 and the joint declaration on denuclearisation in September 1992.

The conflict between North Korea and the U.S. began to surface in October 1992 over the nature and the status of North Korea’s past efforts for nuclear weapons development. The first phase of the conflict, brought to the foreground by the North Korea’s announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT regime in March 1993, accelerated towards a military crisis, before being defused in October 1994 with the signing of the framework agreement.

The south-north Korea relations and the north Korea-U.S. relations moved forward with a great speed following the inter-Korea summit in June 2000, before coming to a virtual freeze, on both fronts, in early 2001, with the inauguration of the Bush Administration in the U.S. From April 2002, the dynamics of change, however, seemed to regain its momentum with the visit of north Korea by a special south Korean envoy, the resumption of the progress in the south-north Korea relations, the stepped up process of systemic reform and liberalisation policies in north Korea, and the moves towards normalisation of relations between north Korea and Japan, spurred on by the visit to north Korea by the Japanese prime minister.

The process was, however, catapulted into the second phase of north Korea-U.S. conflict with the U.S. announcement, in October 2002, of “north Korea's acknowledgement of uranium enrichment programme”.

The two separate phases of the north Korea-U.S. conflict are identical in their features, as far as they are both manifestations of the clash between
North Korea’s system maintenance strategy and the U.S. global hegemony strategy focused on the non-proliferation regime. The vital difference, however, is injected by a change in the U.S. global strategy following the “September 11”. In the course of waging its war in Afghanistan and against Iraq, the U.S. strategy toward non-proliferation regime and anti-terrorism came to embrace a doctrine of pre-emptive strike and regime change in the “rogue” states.

For North Korea, having been designated as one of the “rogue” states, its conflict with the U.S. has come to take on a vitally crucial concern. The escalation of the north Korea-U.S. conflict has unfolded revealing ever more its potential to explode into a war in the Korean peninsula.

2. The First Phase North Korea-U.S. Conflict and Changes in the North Korean Perception of Security

North Korea has traditionally adopted a “high tension, low cooperation” strategy in her negotiations with antagonistic counterparts. Her negotiation tactics have been seen as too pre-occupied with “formal rationale” and too ready to disregard reciprocity. North Korea tactics, therefore, has been perceived to be irrational. Such a documented attitudinal tendency came to the fore in its typical fashion in the process of the north Korea-U.S. conflict over North Korea’s nuclear weapons development programme.

Despite the unique features and limitations of North Korea’s negotiation strategy, she did, in the process of the first phase conflict with the U.S., secure the minimum conditions for maintaining the integrity of its system. Given the “success” it did achieve, it would be difficult to underestimate the efficacy of North Korea’s negotiation strategy. The attitude maintained by North Korea in the various rounds of negotiations up till today, moreover, demonstrate a certain logical consistency.

The negotiation strategy adopted by North Korea in the course of its interaction with the U.S. in the first phase conflict, therefore, needs to be examined in terms of a change in its perception of security in its pursuit for system maintenance. A change in security perception, shaping the grounds for the consistency between the objective and means in the negotiations for the system maintenance, brings about a fundamental shift in the negotiation strategy. An in-depth understanding of North Korea’s security perception will, therefore, provide an avenue for understanding North Korea’s strategy in addressing its second phase conflict with the U.S., and shed a light on the efforts to assist the process towards an effective resolution of the conflict.

Following the official adoption of an engagement policy in early 1998 by the government of president Kim Dae-Jung in South Korea, four years after the conclusion of the framework agreement in October 1994 between North Korea and the U.S., a debate broke out over the efficacy and consistency of
the principle of separating politics and economic cooperation and reciprocity. The debate was focused on the conceptual definition and actual mode of application of “principle of separation of politics and economic cooperation” and “reciprocity”, and the relationship between these two conceptual pillars.

The ultimate issue at the heart of the contention, however, was the attitude of North Korea. One view was that the North Korean attitude was logically and practically compatible with South Korea’s “engagement policy towards north Korea”. According to this view, North Korea’s system survival strategy was double-featured strategy that simultaneously pursued dogmatism (militarism) and (economic) pragmatism. This view saw North Korea adopting two simultaneous goals/pathways for its survival, that is, “military first” doctrine and “economic strength” agenda, based on a separation of the military-political domain and the economic domain. Given these two determining factors were informing north Korea’s negotiations, this view saw north Korea as wanting to exchange its “military threat” for “economic support” from the others. North Korea’s disposition validated the policy of engagement, which was to be pursued through a combination of “the principle of separating politics and economic cooperation” and “flexible reciprocity”.

What should be noted in the negotiation over the exchange of “passive utility” (from the U.S. and south Korean perspective) of removing the military threat and the “active utility” (from the north Korean perspective) of economic assistance, which followed from the “engagement” policy is the fact that the “economic assistance” for north Korea, which was mired in an economic crisis, was a vital “security good”. While “economic development” was, in the past, a condition for security in as far as it was a necessary factor for the regime legitimating, for north Korea in 1990s, which faced an economic crisis, economic stabilisation, to be obtained through economic assistance, was a direct “security good”. Given the situation, going along with the “engagement” policy of south Korea and U.S., whose basic substance was an exchange between “economic-diplomatic security good” (i.e., economic assistance and system recognition) and military security good (development of weapons of mass destruction), was though to be the “best” option available to the leadership of north Korea.

It is possible to find indications of the shift in North Korea’s perception of “security good” in the process that brought the first phase of north Korea-U.S. conflict to a resolution. The “nuclear issue” that came to be the focus of the conflict between North Korea and the U.S. had double features, as it was, at the same time, an “economic good” (as nuclear energy) and a “military good” (as nuclear weapon). The double feature of the “nuclear issue” came to provide a vehicle, on the one hand, for the “engagement” policy of south Korea and the U.S., and, on the other hand, for the dualistic survival strategy of north Korea, and led to the agreement between north Korea and the U.S.
which saw the “abandonment of nuclear weapons development” and
“assistance for the construction of light-water nuclear energy generation
capacity”. The Geneva Agreement was a product of an interaction between a
change in North Korean perception of security and the special features of the
“nuclear issue”.

One of the major features of the international politics in the late 20th
century, which saw the dissolution of the global cold war regime that was
built on the arms race mechanism, was that economy became an important
“security good” element. That is, today, the world is dominated by a system
of “comprehensive security”. In the case of North Korea, while the reality of
“comprehensive security” came into application at a low scale in the context
of its economic crisis, it did prise open an irrevocable shift in the situation
and perception.2

3. The Changing North Korea and the Break Out of the Second Phase
North Korea-U.S. Conflict

While a shift in the security perception in north Korea was observed in the
process of the negotiations over the first north Korea-U.S. conflict, north
Korea still remained, for most of the “outside” world an unknown quality, as
a state and a nation. Following the most severe economic crisis in the mid-
1990s, significant “changes” began to appear in North Korea since the late
1990s. Nevertheless, two conflicting views on north Korea continued to
prevail among north Korea observers: one was an image of “unchanging
north Korea”, and the other, “changing north Korea”.

The constitutional amendment in September 1998, the enactment of
“People’s Economic Plan Act” in April 1999, the rise out of the minus
economic growth in 1999, the inter-Korea summit and the subsequent
consolidation of inter-Korea government level cooperation since June 2000,
the consolidation of relations with China and Russia since 2000, the
normalisation of relations with some of the EU countries and expansion of
economic cooperation since 2000, the efforts to improve the relations with
the U.S. in 2000, the emphasis, since 2001, on innovation in philosophical
approach and thought, the “re-building” of technology for the people's
economy, and the improvement in the management system, the enactment, in
April 2001, of the Manufacture Trade Act, etc., provided the indication that
north Korea was initiating a change in direction to build itself into an
economically strong nation.

2 The heightened pressure on north Korea by the U.S. since October 2002 can be said to have fuelled a
tension/conflict between the traditional security perception and the new security perception within
the leading circles in north Korea.
There are two reasons for the continuing conflict over the perception of the changes taking place in North Korea. First, the souring of the relations between North Korea and the U.S. in 2001 and the stagnation in the progress of inter-Korea relations have been taken as the evidence for an absence of change in North Korea. Secondly, the “changes” concerning economic affairs identified in North Korea are not regarded as sufficient grounds to note a broader opening/liberalisation and reform of the whole of North Korea.

It is possible to present some counter arguments to the analysis that North Korea has not changed, without delving on the fundamental limitations of “subjectivism” found in the effort to evaluate the changes in North Korea, by focusing on the inter-Korea relations and North Korea-U.S. relations. It would be difficult to find North Korea as the causal agent for the stagnation in the inter-Korea relations and the aggravation of the North Korea-U.S. relations. North Korea has, since the late 1990s, made consistent efforts to enter into the international society through steady improvement of relations. The normalisation of the relations and the efforts to develop economic cooperation with the E.U. and its member countries is a good example of this. The experience of China and Vietnam presents precedents for a separation of economic opening and political-military liberalisation in international policy.

To present a simplified picture, the stagnation in the inter-Korea relations, in which the weaknesses in the capacity of the South Korean society played a part, and the aggravation of the North Korea-U.S. relations put in motion by the U.S. -- especially the growing momentum of anti-terrorism campaign by the U.S. following September 11 and the “axis of evil” doctrine pronounced in January 2001 -- have been major developments that have caused the tangle in the liberalisation of international policy which North Korea had began to embark on after much difficulty.

The various “changes” North Korea has began to undertake in the realm of economics since the late 1990s can be categorised into three trends: the rebuilding of the collapsed socialist economic system, the innovation in the industrial structure and technology, that is, modernisation, and the outward liberalisation.

The central determination of the North Korean leadership is found to focus on rebuilding the economic system, as can be seen in the Constitutional amendment, the legislation of the People’s Economy Planning Act, and the continued emphasis on the usual mass mobilisations under various changing slogans. The central streak of attitude detected in these efforts and the continuing “bellicose” rhetorical and discourse patterns in its articulations towards the U.S. and South Korea are brought together as the evidence for the thesis that there is no change in North Korea.

The rebuilding of the system, however, addresses the need to re-organise and streamline the planning institutions and capacity, and the latter is very much linked to the efforts to bring about an increase in exports.
People’s Economy Planning Act). Given this, the re-building efforts cannot automatically be identified as a corroborating evidence for the “no change” view.

The efforts to rebuild the economic system, seen in the background of the near collapse of the economic institutions -- focusing as it does on restoring the theoretically prescribed archetypical planning agency -- could, rather, be seen as a re-organisation of the foundation which would make the economic changes possible. Furthermore, if the reconstruction of the economic system aims to bring about not only the normalisation of the formal sector and economic stability through the reorganisation of the planning capacity, but is also oriented to technological innovation and outward liberalisation, then, it can be seen, unlike the past efforts, as a preparatory endeavours towards liberalisation and reform. Innovation and opening, in freeing the planning agency from the influence of bureaucratic agencies, will pave the way for a rationalisation of the basic tenets of the economic management.

A more positive interpretation of the changes in North Korea provides a basis for the conjecture that the North Korean economy is undergoing a transition phase. The simultaneous pursuit of system reorganisation, innovation, and outward liberalisation is clearly a new policy option the north Korean leadership has arrived at having ploughed through so many years of crisis. The new policy orientation, if it can begin to produce significant initial results on the basis of a more amenable external environment, could provide the impetus for a more thorough going opening and reform. The aggravation of the external environment and “achievement deficit”, however, will draw north Korean economy back to the past practices of closing itself off to the outside, sprouting seeds of even more serious economic crisis in the near future. The North Korean economy now, it is possible to conclude, stands at a critical cross-roads.

An analysis of the efforts to bring about an improvement in the economic management system and economic liberalisation initiative, which began to gain momentum since July 2002, provides ample grounds to anticipate that north Korea stands at the starting line for a change towards a kind of market economy system. The logical import of the innovation measures, such as the effort to address the economic problems and the black market with price adjustment, adds weight to such anticipation. Moreover, the substance of the innovation/improvement efforts, when combined with the logic and the mechanism of the economic system, contains, in spite of the intention of the policy makers, a tendency to promote the development of a market economy.

The dramatic changes in the policy, as seen in the measures to improve the economic management system, the designation of Shinju as a special administrative area (September 12, 2002), the opening of the Gumgang Mountain Tourism District (October 23, 2002), the establishment of Gaeseong Industrial Park (November 13, 2003), provide sufficient ground to
rule out the prospect of incremental changes in North Korean economic policy and economic system. This points to two possible prospects.

A positive prospect, on the basis of a successful performance of the reform and the opening, would forecast the development of a market economy and acceleration of the liberalisation process in North Korea. It is likely that economic stabilisation and economic growth are achieved simultaneously. This will pave the way for a process of a gradual systemic transformation of the North Korean system. It is possible to anticipate economic growth led system transformation in North Korea where economic growth and system transformation take place gradually, simultaneously.

A negative prospect would stem from a failure to achieve a break out from economic stagnation despite market development and opening. This would set in motion a return to aggravated economic crisis. This would give rise to a severe instability in the North Korean system; and North Korea may fall into a system-wide crisis. The efforts of the North Korean leadership to achieve systemic stability or preservation of the system may end in a failure.

The most important factor determining the future prospect lies with the progress in the improvement in North Korea’s international relations.

North Korea strived to bring about improvement in its external relations, which loomed as the necessary condition for the success of its economic reform and economic opening that it had undertaken simultaneously. The highlight of the North Korean effort to bring about improvement in its external relations came with the summit meeting with Japan in September 2002. North Korea adopted a very active approach in its effort to improve the relations with Japan, even to the extent of acknowledging the kidnappings of Japanese nationals, which it had for long denied.

In the late September 2002, the growing anticipation of the normalisation of relations between North Korea and Japan began to raise hopes for the establishment of a system of peace and cooperation in the north-east Asia. But, this was the moment when the second phase of North Korea-U.S. conflict over North Korea’s nuclear weapons development broke out. The U.S. administration made public, in October 2002, that North Korea had acknowledged that it had a programme for nuclear weapons development.

Ironically, the first phase conflict between North Korea and the U.S. broke out at the moment when the inter-Korea relations were poised to enter into a new level. Similarly, the second phase conflict burst onto the scene at a time when North Korea’s reform and opening, and an improvement in the relations between North Korea and Japan were ready to be launched into a quick start. The conflict between North Korea and the U.S. over two phases had the impact of aborting the prospect and process of a new peaceful order in the Korean peninsula and north-east Asia.
4. The Basic Features of the Second Phase North Korea-U.S. Conflict and the Shaping of its Peaceful Resolution

The fundamental cause of the second phase North Korea-U.S. conflict lies, firstly, in the fact that the antagonistic relations between North Korea and the U.S. were not fully resolved, neither with the dissolution of the global cold war system nor with the successful conclusion of the first phase conflict. The second aspect of the cause is found in the perception of the U.S. administration that its global hegemonic strategy, including the non-proliferation regime and the anti-terrorism programme, is being challenged by North Korea. The fundamental resolution of the North Korea-U.S. conflict, then, is only possible when two changes take place: the definitive end to the military and diplomatic distrust between North Korea and the U.S.; a change in the U.S. global strategy.

The perception of North Korea on the part of the U.S. administration and the U.S. global strategy are, therefore, critical factors in the unfolding of the North Korea-U.S. conflict. It would also call for a change in the perception of the U.S. by the North Korean regime and an abandonment of its survival strategy anchored on military means (the shift from the dualistic strategy to a unitary strategy). In summary, the U.S. and North Korea both need to change their respective views of each other and turn away from a world view founded on militaristic perspective.

The antagonistic and hostile relations between North Korea and the U.S. that have come to the fore over the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons development through the two phases of the conflict appears, on the surface, to be a symmetric relationship. But, because it is, in reality, an asymmetric relationship, it has a tendency to precipitate the Korean peninsula into a crisis.

The U.S. views the North Korean development of weapons of mass destruction, their export, and its support for terrorists as a source of threat. On the other hand, North Korea views the U.S. economic sanctions and antagonistic/belligerent policies toward it as a threat against the survival of its system.

The antagonistic relationship between North Korea and the U.S., in the context of the mutual threat, can be described as symmetric. But, while the North Korean threat (to the U.S.) is a potential threat, the U.S. threat (to North Korea) is a real one. While the U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea and its hostile policy have the capacity to impact directly on the North Korean efforts for economic reform and opening; North Korea, on the other hand, because of the asymmetry in the military capacity and geographical

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Because of this very condition, the U.S. perceives economic sanctions against North Korea as one of the most effective means of applying pressure on North Korea.
distance, is not in a realistic position to undertake a real attack on the U.S. While north Korea has proclaimed that it would launch an attack on the U.S. target anywhere in the world if and when the U.S. initiates an economic sanction against it, north Korea would only be able to launch a retaliatory action -- regardless of whether it would be successful -- only on south Korea and the U.S. troops deployed in south Korea. Because of this very asymmetry, while the Republican U.S. administration regards the military attack on North Korea as a realistic policy instrument, North Korea continues to demand the U.S. to establish a non-aggression agreement or a guarantee of recognition. For the same reason, the civil society and government in South Korea demand that a military attack should be rule out from the policy options.

Considering the asymmetry in the level of threat between north Korea and the U.S. related to the issue of north Korean nuclear weapons development, and the fundamental cause of the conflict between north Korea and the U.S., the U.S. global hegemonic strategy and its north-east Asian strategy needs to be reformulated, and security and economic cooperation in north-east Asia needs to be consolidated in order to bring about a peaceful resolution of the current north Korea-U.S. conflict and the establishment of peaceful order in the Korean peninsula.

As the second phase north Korea-U.S. conflict, that has unfolded over the issue of north Korean nuclear weapons development, has its roots in the long history of antagonism between north Korea and the U.S., it would be necessary for the U.S. global hegemonic strategy to be transformed into a policy for peaceful order that excludes the option of pre-emptive strike, in order to bring about an improvement in the relationship between north Korea and the U.S. as the basis for the peaceful resolution of the current conflict.

The formation of a stable north Korea-U.S. relation is closely linked to the realisation of a peaceful order in north-east Asia. North Korea demands the U.S. to guarantee non-aggression. This cannot but take a form of multilateral guarantee on the basis of the participation of the nations in the region. This development, ultimately, will call for a normalisation of the relations between North Korea and the U.S., and a change in the relations between the various countries in north-east Asia. The multilateral negotiations for the resolution of the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons development programme (the current Beijing six-party talks) will, therefore, need to be shifted into a discussion on north-east Asia regional security and economic cooperation.

If North Korea were, in this process of change, to overcome the economic

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4 The U.S. plan for a military action against north Korea in 1994 clearly demonstrated the very asymmetry that exists between north Korea and the U.S.
crisis, undergo a systemic transformation, and become a “normal” state having abandoned militarism,5 the north Korea-U.S. conflict would finally come to a complete resolution. If this course of development is not allowed to proceed, north Korea will continue to insist on its dualistic strategy, and the possibility of north Korean development of weapons of mass destruction and the possibility of the system collapse will continue to haunt north-east Asia. If the conflict is not brought to a resolution through peaceful means, instability and arms race will prevail in the Korean peninsula and north-east Asia. It is not possible, at the same time, to rule out the collapse of North Korea through an internal implosion fuelled by a worsening of the economic crisis, which will have a radical impact in the Korean peninsula and north-east Asia.

5. Three Views on the North Korea-U.S. Conflict

The emergence of a crisis in the Korean peninsula due to the north Korea-U.S. conflict has given rise to three divergent views, in South Korea, over the understanding of the nature of the north Korea-U.S. conflict and the avenues for its resolution. The existence of differing views reflects the development of varied perception of North Korea and the U.S. in South Korea, brought about by the process of the dissolution of the global cold war system, the democratisation in South Korean society, and the progress of changes in the relationship between South and North Korea. The civil society groups in South Korea, pursuing a peaceful resolution of the north Korea-U.S. conflict, takes the third view outline below.

View 1: The Security Crisis in the Korean Peninsula and the ROK-U.S. Concertation

The nuclear weapons development by North Korea, not only aggravates the security environment for South Korea, but triggers an intensification of the arms race in the Korean peninsula and north-east Asia. North Korea, which “may come to possess or already possess nuclear weapons”, intends to pursue a hard-lined policy towards the U.S. by holding south Korea as a kind of a military hostage. South Korea, therefore, in order to counter north Korea, which is its greatest military threat, and so-called the “main enemy”, needs to consolidate the concertation, more specifically, military alliance, with the U.S. Accepting the strategy of the Bush administration, which has developed an appropriate hard line policy towards north Korea, designated as an

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5 This preposition derives from the interpretation of the changes in north Korea undertaken in the above section 3. The “policy towards north Korea”, it becomes clear, cannot be separated from the “understanding of north Korea”.
element in the “axis of evil”, will assist in nullifying north Korea’s military intentions. This view, encapsulated by the slogan, “oppose nuclear weapons, oppose Kim Jung Il”, perceives north Korea on the basis of the traditional anti-communism, and holds “reunification by victory over communism” -- including absorptive reunification following the collapse of north Korea -- as the most effective policy for reunification.

**View 2: The U.S. Policy of Hostility and National Concertation**

The nuclear weapons development by North Korea does not contain military intentions. Rather, the U.S., through its policy of pressuring North Korea, aims to bring about North Korea’s collapse. The U.S. policy of hostility towards North Korea is heightening the war crisis in the Korean peninsula. While North Korea does not have the intention to possess nuclear weapons, it may, if the U.S. persists with the policy of hostility, come to possess weapons even more powerful than nuclear weapons. The attempt to develop nuclear weapons can be justified in terms of obtaining a capacity for self-defence. The Korean people, in order to secure peace in the Korean peninsula, need to work in concert. The concertation of people – in south and North Korea together -- can pave the way for peace and reunification. Only the concertation of the people of Korea against the U.S., the “home and root of evil” can save the Korean peninsula from war. This view can be summarised, roughly, by the slogan, “oppose the U.S., oppose the war”. This view, however, is relatively insensitive to the consequences that would arise from the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea.

**View 3: The North Korea-U.S. Conflict and the Policy of Engagement with North Korea**

The nuclear weapons development by North Korea will bring about an aggravation of security environment in north-east Asia and an intensification of the arms race. At the same time, the U.S. policy of pressuring North Korea is causing serious instability in the overall political situation in north-east Asia. For North Korea, the “nuclear” is a strategic instrument that has “double purpose”. What is important is not the “removal” of the “nuclear”, but identifying the strategic intention, and paving the way for north Korea to move on where it would not feel the “need” to invoke “nuclear”. This would be the most effective medium-to-long term policy.

There is a need to secure a maximum space for policy autonomy between “ROLK-U.S. concertation” and “people’s concertation”, in which to develop alternative policies for peace and reunification and international relations. While it cannot be denied that policy autonomy is limited, no country has perfect policy autonomy. “Appropriate balance” between “ROLK-U.S. concertation” and “people’s concertation” is an *ad hoc* and non-strategic
concept. It could be re-articulated, in a rhetorical exercise, as in the following: through an interaction between a “tension-filled ROK-U.S. concertation” (maintaining an appropriate check on the U.S. policy but maintaining the cooperation between the U.S. and south Korea) and a “critical people’s concertation” (criticising both north Korea’s nuclear weapons development and its policy towards the U.S., promoting security in the Korean peninsula through the development of the inter-Korea relations, and assisting north Korea in its efforts for reform and opening) south Korea should develop a diplomatic capacity, based on mobilising international consensus, to mediate between north Korea and the U.S. to defuse and to bring the conflict to a resolution.

The threat of war in the Korean peninsula arises from the intensification of the north Korea-U.S. conflict. The two factors which fuel the seriousness of the conflict are: first, the strategy of the U.S., the unitary hegemonic state, for hegemony in north-east Asia founded on its doctrine of pre-emptive strike and non-proliferation regime; second, north Korea’s “military first” doctrine or military prioritism in the context of a drawn out economic crisis and threats arising from the U.S. pressure policy. The engagement policy, which has developed in South Korea, aims to bring about a stabilisation of the current North Korean system, to pave the way for encouraging North Korea to move towards greater liberalisation and reform. It is paramount, in this process, to persuade the U.S. to accept the policy changes taking place in North Korea. Denying the changes in north Korea is riddled with contradictions, as it signifies, on the one hand, denying the historical experience, and on the other hand, denying the future negotiation policy.6

6. The Positions and Views of North Korea and the U.S. Following the Six-Party Meeting

With the escalation of crisis in the Korean peninsula, arising from the north Korea-U.S. conflict over the issue of North Korea nuclear weapons

6 From this perspective, it is possible to criticise the approach the south Korea government has taken towards the north Korea-U.S. conflict. First, adoption of a fundamentalist approach on a strategic level towards the issue of north Korean nuclear issue is unrealistic. There is no negotiation at the moment because both north Korea and the U.S. are taking the fundamentalist positions. There is a need for gradualist strategy aimed at toning down the mutual distrust between north Korea and the U.S. Second, the prioritisation of the resolution of the north Korean nuclear issue as a pre-requisite for resumption of efforts to bring about improvements in inter-Korea relations is an unrealistic linear thinking. Given the various changes that have taken place in north Korea and the current situation within north Korea, a simultaneous parallel/separated approach is needed. There is a need for an effort to avoid being dragged into the agenda-setting initiative of the U.S. (rogue state, uranium enrichment programme, pre-emptive strike, etc.).
development programme, South Korea and China made efforts to bring North Korea and the U.S. to a direct meeting. The U.S. refused to engage in direct talks with North Korea because of its distrust of North Korea. On the other hand, North Korea refused multi-party negotiations fearing that it could be turned against it as a vehicle for applying more pressure on it. Following much initial positioning, three-party meeting and six-party meetings were held in Beijing, couched in terms of “two-party meeting within a multi-party meeting” or “multi-party meeting including two-party meeting”.

The recent six-party meeting, in that the states in the region were addressing together the north Korea-U.S. conflict, including the North Korea nuclear issues, and in that the concerned states in the region, including south and North Korea, came together for the first time since 1950s to address the issues of the Korean peninsula, was a significant historical development.

North Korea, in the six-party meeting, made a concrete proposal, and appears, even after the conclusion of the meeting, to maintain its proposal. The North Korean proposal is composed of “arrangement for single undertaking settlement” and “simultaneous action sequence”.

In its “arrangement for single undertaking settlement”, the U.S. is to conclude a non-aggression treaty, establish the normalisation of north Korea-U.S. relations, ensure the development of Japan-north Korea and inter-Korea economic cooperation, provide compensation for the loss in electricity supply due to the delay in the construction of the light water nuclear reactor power plant, and complete its construction. In return, North Korea desists from developing nuclear weapons, allow inspections, and ultimately dismantle the nuclear facilities, and suspend missile test launch, and bring an end to missile export.

The “simultaneous action sequence” proposed by north Korea calls for the U.S. and north Korea to undertake simultaneously the resumption of delivery of heavy oil and expand significantly the humanitarian food aid, on the part of the U.S., and the proclamation of the intention to abandon any pursuit of nuclear weapons development programme, on the part of north Korea. At the time the U.S. concludes a non-aggression treaty and completes the compensation for loss of electricity supply, North Korea undertakes to freeze nuclear facilities and nuclear material activity and allow inspection and monitoring.

At the conclusion of North Korea-U.S. and north Korea-Japan normalisation of relations, North Korea finalises its commitment on the missile issues. And finally, North Korea will dismantle its nuclear facilities at the same time as the completion of the construction for light water nuclear reactor power plant.\footnote{7 Korean Central News Agency (Aug. 29 2003)}
The U.S., on the other hand, continues to insist, even after the six-party talks, on North Korea to first abandon its nuclear weapons development programme, and has failed to present any concrete proposals. Recently, the U.S. has suggested making public statement, producing a document, and formulating a multi-party measure on the issue of providing system guarantee to North Korea. But, there is, as yet, no specific proposal for the actual measures. It is possible, given the lack of concrete proposals, to conjecture that the negotiation strategy is not finalised within the U.S. administration. The most fundamental problem on the part of the U.S. is that it has not adopted a clear set of principles in going into negotiations with North Korea.

In the context of rising expectations for the six-party talks, North Korea and the U.S. will need to, in order to bring about a progress in the negotiations, adopt a clear attitude towards the whole process. The diagram below presents the policy options for North Korea and U.S. In order to facilitate a constructive development in the six-party talks, both North Korea and the U.S. will need to make clear changes in their policy attitudes. For North Korea, its system survival policy would need to shift from the current unstable dualistic strategy to one of liberalisation and pragmatism. On the part of the U.S., its current unstable hard line and non-engagement position needs to be shifted to one of stable engagement and moderate stance.

7. The Basic Principles for the Resolution of the North Korea-U.S. Conflict and the Realisation of Peace in the Korean Peninsula

Considering the division and the war in the Korean peninsula following the liberation from the Japanese colonial domination, the changes in the order in post-Cold War Korean, the recent significant developments in the inter-Korea relations, and the nature of the North Korea-U.S. conflict over the North Korean nuclear issues, the principles that need to be adhered to in the efforts to bring about a resolution of the current North Korea-U.S. conflict and the realisation of peace in the Korean peninsula can be summarised into four parts, as in the following:

8 These four principles are adapted with modification from many other foregoing studies. One example in case is Park, Kun-young, et. al., A Report on Peace in the Korean Peninsula: methodologies for overcoming the crisis in the Korean peninsula and Realisation of Peace, (Hanool: 2002). The four principles outlined in this report are: dialogue, not military means, for the resolution of the problem; an approach led by the combined efforts of south and North Korea; move toward multilateralism on the basis of cooperative security; co-existence and common prosperity and exchange and cooperation.
Diagram 1. The Policy Orientation of North Korea and the U.S.

**U.S. North Korea Strategy**

- Engagement
  - Hard line
  - Moderate

**North Korean Survival Strategy**

- Liberalization
  - Pragmatism
  - Militarism
  - Closure

**Principle 1: Peaceful Resolution of the North Korea-U.S. Conflict, Including the North Korean Nuclear Issue**

Peace could never be secured through war. War in the modern society, in which weapons of mass destruction are so highly developed, contradicts and denies the very objective that it is supposedly seeking. The end to tension and conflict obtained through war is not peace that is accompanied by happiness and prosperity, but silence of death. Moreover, war produces consequences that could not be anticipated. Only the resolution of tension and conflict that is secured through peaceful means can be maintained for a long time. War gives an illusion of quick solution of tension and conflict, but leads only to a deepening and aggravation of conflict and confrontation.

A war in the Korean peninsula will not only threaten the very survival of the whole of Korean people, but, will precipitate into the greatest tragedy...
Korean peninsula is an area with the highest concentration of military capacity in the world, and is populated by all the world’s military superpowers. A war erupting in the Korean peninsula may quickly spread and engulf the whole of north-east Asia.

A precision surgical attack on North Korea or an embargo would most likely become an act of threat against the very survival of North Korea. North Korea has repeated declared to construe any precision attack or embargo as an attack threatening its survival. An act of attack against North Korea will provoke North Korea’s retaliatory action against either South Korea or the U.S., and will most likely drive the Korean peninsula into a war.

Given that war is not only ineffective and at the same time dangerous means, the north Korea-U.S. conflict over the north Korean nuclear issue must also be dealt with by peaceful means. In working towards a peaceful resolution, all non-peaceful avenues (embargo or precision attack) need to be removed from the list of available policy instruments. A strategy which entertains non-peaceful means as a possible policy instrument, in consideration for strategic efficiency, signifies logically that there would not be any progress in or towards negotiations until the very brink of war. It cannot realistically rule out the likelihood of a break out of a war as a result of some unanticipated turn of events. Peaceful course may demand difficult and drawn out process, but it will deliver sustainable and secure peace. This is the only effective avenue when the cause of the conflict is mutual distrust.

**Principle 2: Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and Security Cooperation**

The two Koreas have agreed, in September 1992, on the “Joint Declaration for Denuclearised Korean Peninsula”, and on the basis of the spirit of the Declaration, committed themselves to take care in their peaceful use of nuclear energy. Denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula is a principle all north-east Asian states aspire to. What is important is that denuclearisation should not be limited to “non-proliferation”. Denuclearisation must include “nuclear disarmament” together with non-proliferation, and in the medium to long term, a general disarmament in the whole of north-east Asia. North Korean objection to denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula is that it stands as an obstacle in securing its systemic survival. Therefore, a guarantee that all forms of pre-emptive attack, including the use of nuclear weapons, is excluded must be proposed and adhered to in making the demand to north Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons development programme. This calls for the U.S. to make an international commitment to abandon its current position of “pre-emptive attack against rogue states”.

An effective disarmament in north-east requires comprehensive economic and security cooperation. A security strategy, which adopts a particular
nation as the presumed enemy, is likely to fuel an arms race. In the long term, the task of bringing the issue of North Korean weapons of mass destruction to a resolution cannot be addressed without an effective regional security system. This calls for a common commitment to work towards regional security cooperation. The recent six-party talk process provides a valuable opportunity in this regard. The agenda for the talks should not be limited to the dismantling of North Korean nuclear weapons programme, but accompanying nuclear disarmament and security cooperation in the region.

**Principle 3: Continued Efforts of South and North Korea for the Development of Inter-Korea Relations and the Support of the Neighboring Nations**

The efforts of south and North Korea to overcome the system of division and to realise national reconciliation and peaceful reunification should be sustained. The neighbouring nations need to take measures to support the process actively so that it comes to fruition. The two Koreas, despite the insecurity and tension throughout the 50 years of division have made various efforts to overcome the system of division. In the half a century of military standoff, the two Koreas have produced the “July 4 Joint Communiqué” in 1972, the “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation between South and North” in 1991, “Joint Declaration on Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula” in 1992, and the “June 15 Summit Joint Declaration” in 2000.

The two Koreas are continuing in their endeavours to sincerely comply with the joint declaration adopted at the historic inter-Korea summit meeting. The joint efforts of south and North Korea to realise reconciliation and peace will, by promoting the reform and the opening of North Korea, in the short term, contribute to the easing of North Korea-U.S. conflict, and in the long term, to the realisation of peace in north-east Asia. In this regard, support of the neighbouring countries for the development of the inter-Korea relations does not just assist the two Koreas, but, will be investment for the stability of the whole region. We hope for the efforts of south and North Korea for peace, exchange, and cooperation become more concrete, and continue to develop in higher levels, on the basis of the support and cooperation from the international society.9

**Principle 4: Lifting the Economic Sanctions Against North Korea and Promotion of the Development of North Korean Society through Economic Assistance**

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9 This section is drawn from the “Our Suggestion on the Occasion of the Six-Party Talks” issued by the “Peace Forum” (August 26, 2003).
The economic crisis in North Korea, which has made a terrible impact since the early 1990s till today, has been one of the key factors that has given rise to the current North Korea-U.S. conflict and the tension in the Korean peninsula. The systemic insecurity fanned by the economic crisis has, it could be said, propelled North Korea to adopt a more hard-lined international relations policy. Economic reform and liberalisation would be unavoidable for North Korea to overcome the economic crisis. A constructive progress of reform and liberalisation would require outside assistance. External assistance could take many forms. One “passive” form would be the lifting of the economic sanctions the U.S. has imposed on North Korea. Active assistance could come in the form of financial assistance from different countries and international institutions. Institutional and material assistance would have the effect of assisting North Korea achieving the desired outcomes in economic reform and liberalisation, contributing to their deepening.

8. The Proposal From the South Korean Civil Society

Having examined carefully the various proposals that have come into currency in and surrounding the six-party talks over the North Korea-U.S. conflict, and the positions of North Korea and the U.S., the civil society in South Korea focuses on a “comprehensive, staged, and multilateral” avenue as a feasible approach to the resolution of the central issue.

Given the depth of distrust between North Korea and the U.S. and the gravity of the threat, the negotiations for the resolution of the conflict must address all the issues which shape the North Korea-U.S. conflict in a comprehensive manner.

As the fear of the distrust and threat held by both parties cannot be removed in a single action, it must be coursed through a stage upon stage process of mutual confidence building measures as a part of a medium to long-term effort towards building a cooperative relationship.

Lastly, as the distrust or lack of confidence in each other makes any negotiation taking off in the first place and accepting any compromise difficult, there is a need for the participation of concerned countries as mediators and guarantors, setting a multilateral framework for the process.

Recently, North Korea is seen to emphasize comprehensive and phased approach, while the U.S. is putting a stress on multilateral approach. It is interesting to note, at this point, that North Korea is currently taking part in the six-party talks, and the U.S. had, in the past, called for comprehensive and phased approach. Given the developments of the positions held by two, comprehensive, stage upon stage, and multilateral approach would be
acceptable to both North Korea and the U.S.

The Table 1, below, is a brief configuration of the comprehensive, stage upon stage, and multilateral approach. Following is an elaboration of the features and the specific substance of the proposed approach.

First, the negotiation process addresses all the pertinent issues in a comprehensive manner, but designates concrete measures to be undertaken in different stages. The progress of a stage of implementation is accompanied by a continuation of negotiations over issues, which will be subject of implementation action in the next stage. The negotiations is comprehensive in the scope of issues being addressed, but will be undertaken in stages.

The proposal provides a clear articulation on the role of the concerned countries to assist the progress of north Korea-U.S. negotiations and confidence building between the two. In particular, it provides a clear guideline for their role in economic assistance and improvement in the relations between North Korea and Japan.

Lastly, the civil society proposal for a comprehensive, stage upon stage, and multilateral framework of negotiations excludes the fundamentalist solutions or linear approach to the work of confronting the complex issues and situation.¹⁰

In the first stage, north Korea and the U.S. are called on to renounce, without any conditions, hostile intentions and actions against each other, and the other concerned nations are brought in to stand as guarantors of their

¹⁰ There cannot be any genuine course of resolution in the north Korea-U.S. conflict if a fundamentalist attitude is adopted in the strategic level. While the objective outlined by the leaders of south Korea and the U.S. in their first summit meeting for “complete and verifiable and irreversible removal of north Korean nuclear weapons development programme” may have a significance as a medium to long term goal, it is devoid of any practical possibilities for any kind of negotiation. It should be noted clearly that one of the key reasons for the deadlock in the negotiations between north Korea and the U.S. is that both north Korea and the U.S. have taken a fundamentalist position rooted in their own concerns. The linear approach of the south Korean government in setting the resolution of the north Korean nuclear issue as the top-most priority, and planning to upgrade the development of inter-Korea relations only after the satisfactory resolution of the nuclear issue is totally unrealistic. This sets the danger of drawing and locking south Korea into the agenda setting dominated by the U.S. South Korea needs to address security issues and economic issues simultaneously and endeavour to tackle the issue in a comprehensive manner. This capacity to adopt a simultaneous and comprehensive approach applies also to the need to consider the issues of peace and cooperation in north-east Asia in the same breath as the consideration for peace and reunification in the Korean peninsula.
declaration. The first stage is devoted to and focuses on restraining from aggravating the current situation, and moving forward to bring about improvements in those areas other than the north Korea-U.S. relations.

The work of formulating a document capturing the declarations concerning non-aggression towards North Korea and the system security for North Korea is to be worked out in concrete detail through the second stage negotiations that take place during the first implementation stage.

In order to give strength to the content of the declaration, which take place in the context of distrust, the declaration should/may contain the possibility of taking defensive measures if the other side continues with hostile action.

While it is not necessary to set the deadline for removing hostile actions, it should be completed by the time the second stage negotiation is completed. The period for the first stage should be about one year, while the construction of the light water nuclear reactor power plant and the delivery of heavy oil should be resumed after six months.

In terms of the losses suffered by North Korea due to delays in the construction of the light water nuclear reactor power plant and the suspension of the delivery of heavy oil, the settlement should include a commitment by China, South Korea, and Japan to undertake compensation for the losses suffered by the suspension of oil delivery.

During this period, the negotiations for the normalisation of relations between North Korea and Japan, put on hold due to the break out the north Korea-U.S. conflict, should be resumed. It should be brought to a conclusion when the second stage negotiation is brought to a completion ready to go into implementation.

The second stage calls for concrete steps by North Korea and the U.S. to dissolve the hostile relations and to produce a document containing confidence building commitments. During this period, North Korea would be required to permit inspection for weapons of mass destruction, and the U.S. would be required to lift its economic sanctions against North Korea. While the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea could be

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11 At this stage, in order to prevent the aggravation of the situation, north Korea needs to declare unconditionally its commitment to abandon nuclear weapons development programme, and the U.S. to declare its commitment to renounce the use of military force against north Korea. If the sequencing is a problem, north Korea could declare its commitment first, and demand the U.S. to make its declaration within a certain period, and propose to begin a negotiations for verification/inspection after the U.S. declaration has been made. On the other hand, the U.S. could renounce the use of military force, and indicate the efficacy of its declaration after the north Korean declaration of renunciation of nuclear weapons development programme, as it makes its demands for negotiation for verification/inspection. This sequencing method is an adaptation of that contained in the Geneva Agreement. The demand for a perfect and complete reciprocity in the context of mutual distrust is only an indication of the depth of the distrust.
implemented in stages, it needs to include those elements which are needed for north Korea’s economic reform and liberalisation (such as, export of north Korean goods to the U.S. and membership in international organisations).

Negotiations for disarmament in the Korean peninsula is launched in this stage, while the concerned countries and international organisations begin their economic assistance to North Korea. The second stage could be expected to last around three years.

The third stage is devoted to finalisation of the normalisation of relations between north Korea and the U.S. North Korea would be required to dismantle the weapons of mass destruction and transfer them, while the U.S. begins economic assistance to north Korea. Nations in north-east Asia begins a process of nuclear disarmament to realise denuclearisation of north-east Asia, and begin to undertake a plan for consolidation of north-east Asian economic cooperation.

While the six-party talks for the resolution of the north Korea-U.S. conflict is not reconvened, its resumption seems not so far away. At this stage, North Korea, the U.S. and the related nations would need to take caution and care on some issues.

First, north Korea and the U.S. should not just stress the distrust and concern it has of the other, but take into consideration the distrust and concern the other has of it. The concerned participating countries will need to seek avenues for the peaceful resolution of the north Korea-U.S conflict through mutual respect for each other.

The resolution of the north Korea-U.S conflict is needed not only for the stability and security of North Korea and the U.S., but also for peace and prosperity for the whole of north-east Asia. The elements, which would create difficulties in the current stage of negotiations, (such as human rights situation in north Korea or the kidnapping of Japanese nationals) should be raised in stages.

Second, even while the six-party talks has not resumed, the related nations should take care not to aggravate the external environment for north Korea’s efforts for outward liberalisation and inward reform. Successful progress of liberalisation and reform in North Korea will bring about a stabilisation of the North Korean system, and it will contribute to strengthening the flexibility in North Korea’s U.S. policy and international relations policy. Economic cooperation, over and above humanitarian assistance, is sine qua non for the success for North Korea’s liberalisation and reform policies. The deepening of liberalisation and reform will bring about a greater external dependence, paving the way for eventual abandonment of hostile foreign policy stance in order to bring about an improvement in external relations. Support and assistance for North Korea’s liberalisation and reform may take time in achieving peace dividends, but it can surely bring about, in the long
term, positive results without extracting serious sacrifices.

Third, the nations in north-east Asia needs to start a process of multilateral
discussions for security and economic cooperation in order to initiate a
moment to bring the north Korean nuclear issues to a resolution in the
context of regional security and economic cooperation. The six-party talks,
while it addresses the North Korean nuclear issues, therefore, should not just
focus on this issue only. When the North Korea nuclear issue is addressed in
the course of tackling the agenda for the construction of a north-east Asian
cooperation system, north Korea would be willing to participate in the
multilateral discussion because of its economic and security needs.

Regional cooperation in north-east Asia will, through ruling out the threat
and possibility of war not only from the Korean peninsula, but from the
whole of north-east Asia, will, on the one hand, contribute to the
improvement in the relations between south and north Korea and peaceful
reunification in the Korean peninsula, and, on the other hand, to the peace
and prosperity in the north-east Asian region.
<Table 1> Comprehensive, Staged, and Multilateral Approach to the Resolution of North Korea-U.S. Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Negotiation</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Role of Related Countries</th>
<th>Key Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Key Elements</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Stage</td>
<td>Establish a comprehensive negotiation and implementation plan covering the issues in the north Korea-U.S. conflict</td>
<td>Declaration to renounce hostile action</td>
<td>Declaration and implementation to renounce nuclear weapons development and possession</td>
<td>Declaration to renounce aggression against north Korea, including a renunciation of pre-emptive attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Stage</td>
<td>Negotiation on implementation plan for confidence building measures</td>
<td>Undertaking for confidence building and reconciliation</td>
<td>Permission for inspections on weapons of mass destruction</td>
<td>Written declaration on non-aggression towards north Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Stage</td>
<td>Concrete discussions on cooperation</td>
<td>Normalisation of north Korea-U.S. relations, and Move towards regional cooperation</td>
<td>Dismantling of weapons of mass destruction, and A general disarmament</td>
<td>* Improvement in relations with north Korea, and * Economic assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Peace Issues on the Korean Peninsula

The Kim Dae-jung government, inaugurated in the transitional period from the Cold War to the post-Cold War eras, concentrated on the management of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula but was not successful in setting up alternatives to a peace structure. Considering that the problems on the Korean Peninsula are complex in structure and combined with both global and internal characteristics, the changes in the US foreign policy with the advent of the Bush Administration affected changes in the basic policy framework on the Korean Peninsula. The missile negotiations between North Korea and the US stalemated, with increasing skepticism over the Geneva Agreement and there was no further progress of North Korean participation in international society.

The changes in policy towards North Korea by the Bush Administration have increased the tension between the two countries and brought the execution of the Geneva Agreement, requiring long-term comprehensive mutual implementation, to a standstill. Furthermore, the mutuality of the
tripartite North Korea-South Korea-US relations established during the second term of the Clinton Administration has been aggravated into a tense relationship. The difference in approach by the US and South Korea towards North Korea along with the tense relationship between North Korea and the US have continued to suppress intra-Korean relations.

Due to the initial stages in confidence building between North and South Korea, the aggravation of the global situation, and low support internally, the Kim Dae-jung government was unable to play a central role in establishing a peace structure.

As such, the purpose of the new government in reunification and security matters is to establish internally an active support base for peace, to deter conflicts through confidence-building in intra-Korean relations, and to get guarantees on the peace structure from international society.

However, peace building on the Korean Peninsula will never be resolved in a short time. A step-by-step approach is needed. What is most urgent is the alleviation of the nuclear crisis, then the management of the execution systems of the comprehensive negotiations, and in the long run, the formation of a stable peace structure. And if South Korea takes on an active role in the resolution of the nuclear crisis, the ‘peaceful leadership’ of South Korea would be confirmed in the implementation of the comprehensive negotiations and establishment of a peace structure.

2. The Establishment of a Peace Structure on the Korean Peninsula

The resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis and the establishment of a peace structure on the Korean Peninsula can be divided into three stages. The first stage calls for the alleviation of tensions between North Korea and the US through the alleviation of mistrust and coming to an agreement on comprehensive negotiation. The second stage calls for the settlement of the
North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) problem, the normalization of relations between North Korea and the US, and the implementation of comprehensive approaches. The third stage calls for the establishment of an East Asian security system of cooperation around the peace structure of the Korean Peninsula. The alleviation of tensions must be undertaken by the US and North Korea on a short-term basis, but from the stages of the implementation of the comprehensive negotiations, multi-party cooperative methods are needed.

The purpose in the alleviation of tensions is to end the stalemate of the Geneva Agreement systems created after the visit to North Korea by special envoy James Kelly in October 2002 and to foster the mood for dialogue to discuss measures for comprehensive negotiations. There have been multi-party talks recently but what is more important is how to end the tensions between North Korea and the US. Regardless of the type of dialogue, North Korea must end suspicion of its possession of enriched uranium for use in the new nuclear development program, re-confirm the principles of denuclearization, and return to the NPT system. On North Korean demands for guarantees of its system, the US promises of non-aggression against North Korea must be guaranteed in a more responsible way and it will also be realistic if neighboring nations near the Korean Peninsula supplement these measures.

The problem now lies with the Geneva Agreement and the latest developments in the comprehensive negotiations. In relation to energy matters, many diverse measures are being discussed, such as the passage of the Siberian gas pipeline through North Korea. But the important thing is that the energy is needed by North Korea immediately. Accordingly, the construction of the light water reactor (the result of the Geneva Agreement) must be continued and the provision of oil is necessary, until new agreements are ready.
To lessen tensions, a system is necessary to manage the long-term mutual implementation from the beginning of the new dialogue on the framework of comprehensive negotiations. Considering the precepts of the Geneva Agreement, it is necessary that related countries like South Korea participate in the multi-party implementation of the comprehensive agreements instead of designating the process to North Korea and the US.

The comprehensive approach measure deals with the settlement of the problem of weapons of mass destruction and the normalization of relationships between North Korean and the US and North Korea and Japan. North Korea must provide transparency on issues regarding nuclear weapons, missiles, and weapons of mass destruction, and utilize existing international bodies for objective inspection, or form a new international body.

On economic cooperation, North Korea is demanding the lifting of the US sanctions on its economy and for countries like South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia to provide realistic support. For North Korea to participate in the East Asian economic community, there must be harmony among relevant countries, with South Korea undertaking public projects of cooperation, Japan pursuing diplomatic ties with North Korea and funds for economic cooperation, the linking of the Chinese and Russian railways and the passage of Siberian gas pipeline through North Korea. The comprehensive implementation and subsequent economic cooperation is not the result of the abandoning of weapons of mass destruction, but will become a process of establishing a basic environment of essential East Asian economic cooperation.

From the stage of comprehensive negotiations, dialogue on the conclusion of a permanent peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula must be undertaken simultaneously. The armistice has been incapacitated and it is the
transitional stage since a peace treaty has not yet been signed. The truce signed in 1953, regulations prohibiting the entry of weapons, and the Joint Monitoring Commission have proved to be dead letters and the Joint Monitoring Commission has become dysfunctional after being rejected by North Korea.

The implementation of a peace structure on the Korean Peninsula is possible with the alleviation of tensions through the execution of the sub-agreements on non-aggression, the transformation of the armistice to a peace treaty with the participation of North Korea, South Korea, the US, and China, the establishment of a cooperative security mechanism with Japan and Russia participating, and finally, the execution of these one after the other. Especially in the global security environment is a need for the active use of the provisions of non-aggression (Article 2 clause 12) in the Basic Agreement, which stipulates the formation of a Joint Military Commission to accomplish step-by-step disarmament and measures for military confidence building. It is necessary to reduce the possibility of military threat within the basic framework of the Basic Agreement and to receive international guarantees on the peace structure on the Korean Peninsula. For this to be possible, the 4-party talks, which started in 1996, must be activated. After the signing of the peace treaty through the 4-party talks, this must progress to include Japan and Russia into 6-party talks to achieve a multilateral security mechanism in East Asia.

At the present, there is an inevitable aspect of the presence of US troops in Korea, owing to the reality on the Korean Peninsula and East Asia, but there is a need for reform of the Korean Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the US, to meet the standards of German and Japanese agreements with the US. With the dismantling of the Cold War structure in the long run, there is a need for the transformation of the US-South Korean alliance (based on a policy of deterrence against North Korea) into a regional alliance for
maintaining stability in the East Asian region. For this, there is a need for the establishment of a cooperative security mechanism among the countries in the region.

3. Directions for the Promotion of North-South Korean Economic Cooperation

1) Principles of Exchanges & Cooperation: Humanism, Competitiveness, And Public Good

North-South Korean economic cooperation is based on intra-Korean mutual prosperity and East Asian economic cooperation. Geographically, the linking of transportation (trains, etc) and energy (gas, etc) of East Asian countries is only possible with North and South Korea being linked up as well. On the North Korean side, the normalization of railways is an important issue together with the passage of the gas pipeline through its territory. On the investment side, North Korea would be a mid-point for countries searching for ways to enter the markets of north eastern China, and Siberia, Russia. As such, the development of South Korea into the economic hub of East Asia (one of the major goals of the new government) must be considered on the framework of active North-South Korean economic cooperation.

North-South Korean exchanges and cooperation are based on three categories: humanistic support, civilian economic cooperation, and projects of public cooperation. Humanistic support is given in the spirit of humanism and brotherhood as part of efforts to overcome the serious food shortages and malnutrition in North Korea and to create a conciliatory environment of intra-Korean relations through food aid and fertilizers. Civilian economic cooperation includes trade, processing of brought-in materials, and investment by civilian corporations in North Korea. Projects of public cooperation help create an environment facilitative of investment and in the
long run, aim to reduce the costs of reunification through the construction of social infrastructure such as the construction of the Gaesong Industrial Complex and the linking of the Gyungui Railway.

Humanistic support is based on humanism, civilian economic cooperation is based on economic competitiveness, and public cooperation projects are based on public good. Civilian cooperation is undertaken if individual corporations consider investment in North Korea competitive. Here, the policy of separation of politics and economics must be strictly imposed. In North-South Korean economic cooperation, continuity remains most important and would not be effective if undertaken excessively through the intervention of politicians. Public cooperation projects aim at the creation of an environment for reunification in the long run, the reduction of the costs of reunification, and the creation of an environment susceptible to civilian investments in North Korea. That is to say, public good is more important than economic competitiveness in public cooperation projects.

The differences in the principles of civilian economic cooperation and public cooperation projects should put an end to the controversy surrounding the separation of politics from economics. With investments of government funds in public cooperation projects, state enterprises should basically be the agents for investments. In the case of the Gaesong Industrial Complex, in the case of creation of social overhead capital and supplementary funds for the construction of the industrial complex, the agents of developments should come from the public sector.

As in the case of the Mt. Geumgang Project, a project combining economic competitiveness and public good, the roles of the government and the civilian sector must be clarified. If Mt. Geumgang were a civilian project, government support would not be necessary. But if it were a public project, the Korean National Tourism Organization would undertake the project. But
since this has become a partial-government and partial civilian project, the roles of Hyundai Asan and the government should be clarified.

2) Measures for Stimulating Economic Cooperation

Measures for stimulating economic cooperation lies in North Korean economic policy changes and the smooth operation of North-South Korean economic cooperation, mutually beneficial economic cooperation, and the expansion of North-South Korean economic cooperation into East Asian economic cooperation.

_Economic Modernization of North Korea & Related developments in North-South Korean Economic Cooperation_

Most importantly, the North Korean economy must be transformed into a sustainable economic system. Supply must be expanded with food support, reducing instability in North Korea and preparing North Korea with incentives for opening its doors to the world. The time is ripe to support North Korea, to help it adapt an active stance towards construction of a new economic sphere on the Korean Peninsula. The parts manufacturing industry of North Korea must be fostered and the environment for the processing of brought-in materials must be reformed. The fostering of the manufacturing of electronic parts as well as other parts with economic competitiveness within North Korea, would continue to increase the rate of the local supply of parts. And in order to allow the entry of the textile, shoe, and other related industries, structural support is necessary to minimize the costs of transactions.

With the visit by the North Korean economic inspection party in 2002, the need arose for the modernization of the economy and related measures for the development of the North-South Korean economic community.
Operation of education programs on capitalist economics, common framing of the plan for balanced land development, common research into the promotion of measures for long-term North-South Korean economic community, etc, must be undertaken.

*Measures for Stimulating North-South Korean Economic Cooperation*

First, for the stimulation of public investment projects, it is necessary to re-establish awareness of economic cooperation within South Korean society. It is positive that the stimulation of economic cooperation could be undertaken together by North and South Korea. Economic cooperation is different from regular support and must not be viewed as the economically superior South Korea giving aid to North Korea, but as finding economic means through mutual cooperation. On the methods of economic cooperation policies, productive criticism needs to be more aggressive, but as changes through contacts are the only methods to break the existing Cold War structure, public consensus on reconciliation and policies of cooperation must be established. So the expansion of the North-South Korea Cooperation Fund and increase in the rate of public investments to decrease instability is an urgent matter in North-South Korean economic cooperation.

Second, for the linking of railways (Trans Siberian Railway, Trans Manchurian Railway or Trans China Railway) after the linking of the Gyung-eui Line and the East Sea Line, the modernization of North Korean railways is also needed. Russia estimates that the construction of the related railway in North Korea would take up US$ 24.96 billion dollars (about 3.12 trillion won) and the period of construction three to five years. Therefore, the formation of an international consortium of North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan and EU countries could be considered.
Third, the construction of the Gaesong Industrial Complex is necessary. North-South Korean trade and investment could be tax exempt due to the special circumstances of being a divided nation. At the same time, South Korea, the investor, must create accessibility and the environment for investment. This is different from the construction methods of other `special economic zones'.

Practical development of the Gaesong Industrial Complex is needed, taking into consideration the limitations of the changes in North Korean policy and the global environment. With the linking of the Gyungui Line, cooperative measures must be implemented to strengthen the tourist infrastructure of the Gaesong region (survey, repair, and maintenance of cultural assets) and to increase convenience for tourists (accommodations, etc). Measures must also be taken to set up small common research complexes and processing of brought-in goods to promote environmentally friendly industries and educational complexes to foster the IT industry in North Korea.

Fourth, the structural mechanism of economic cooperation must be cemented through continuous negotiations. With the adoption of the four agreements, structural mechanisms for North-South Korean economic cooperation have been ready for application, but all negotiations have reached a stalemate. There must be more dialogue on the details of the agreements and must progress as a more stable structure through the application of concrete case studies.

North-South Korea Economic Community & Related development of East Asian Economic Cooperation

In the long run, an internal market-oriented economic development must be pursued, based on the market for 70 million Koreans. To be sure, the North
Korean market is still small, and so medium-priced range exports into North Korea would remain at a low level. However, a new economic development strategy must be actively pursued, as internal market-oriented development is possible through long term transactions between North and South Korea and the fixation of the division of labor. At the same time, the North-South Korean economic community should be expanded along with East Asian economic cooperation. Economic cooperation between South Korea, China, Japan and Russia must be strengthened in the East Asian sphere and efforts must be undertaken for the establishment of the East Asian Development Bank to promote the Tumen River development project, the economic modernization of North Korea, the energy-linking project of Asia, etc.

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Chapter 4

Human Rights in North Korea: Dilemmas
Posed in the South

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1. North Korean Issues Today

The foremost issue today is the conflict between North Korea and the U.S. over security concerns. This conflict puts Korea in an unstable environment in many aspects, often gathering a war crisis in the horizon. The so-called 'War on Terror' has certainly deteriorated inter-Korean relations.

At the same time, there is a wide range of serious economic and social crises observed in North Korea today, giving rise to a speculation of its systemic collapse. This speculation has caused a round of debates, which also brought into public attention the implications of this uncertainty on the interests of all countries in Northeast Asia.

Human rights situation in North Korea can be generally said to be very poor. The totalitarian nature of its party-state system does not allow people to enjoy the basic freedom and rights stipulated in various international human rights laws. In addition to this, the basic right to life has been seriously threatened since the mid-1990s due to the almost total failure of the national
economic management. Widespread famine has taken lives en masse and created a large number of refugees with little or no protection.

The North Korean government has been highly reluctant to accept any criticism of its human rights situation. It has often associated human rights talks with a threat to North Korea's survival, and justified its conduct of human rights violations with the right to self-determination and the right to survive as a nation.

At the same time, North Korea has also shown some signs of internal reform, both economic and political, towards more open and friendly relationship with the outside world. In improving relations with the European Union, North Korea had the agenda of human rights included in the talks, the first of this kind in its history. However, since the 'Axis of Evil' speech by US President Bush in 2002, North Korea has returned to an uncompromising stance over its internal matters.

2. Human Rights in North Korea as Seen from South Korea

North Korea's human rights issues have too often been politicized in South Korea: they have been presented as justification for equivalent human rights violations in South Korea, under the authoritarian regimes of the past. As security concerns overwhelmed human rights concerns in South Korea, human rights in North Korea were not viewed as human rights issues either. In divided Korea, security politics prevailed and both North and South Korea developed a mutually dependent discourse system of suppressing human rights concerns within and without through highly politicized national security doctrines.

It was in the late 1980's that non-governmental groups began concerted reconciliation campaigns towards North Korea, which included dissemination of unfamiliar information about North Korea to the South
Korean public. It was the 'Learn about North Korea' campaign. This wave of rethinking partly stopped the demonization of North Korea, a trend set by the South Korean regime, while, at the same time, bringing the human rights situation in North Korea to public attention. This generated lively debates, often very much ideological, on the nature of the North Korean system and how South Korea should approach human rights issues in the North.

When the dire famine in North Korea became known in the mid-1990s, a large number of civic groups in South Korea began to appeal for sustained humanitarian aids to the North by pointing out the impact of famine as the most critical infringement on basic rights of human beings. Ideological debates recoiled and humanitarian concerns surged. Public participation to fund-raise and send food and medicine was high. At the same time, the famine itself became strong moral ground for critics of North Korea, making a case for the illegitimacy of the regime in Pyongyang.

South Korea's reconciliatory approach to North Korea, particularly since 1998 and the popular 'Sunshine Policy' had the effect of placing various debates about the North onto a track of hope, hope for gradual progress and change in the situation in North Korea. However, economic crisis was prolonged, tension between North Korea and the US escalated, and North Korea showed little signs of giving up its belligerent stance towards the South. Much of the public felt uneasy about this continuity, which has translated into the recent round of debates on South Korea's approach to the North. One of the main arguments against reconciliation is expressed as, 'North Korea's constancy despite the shower of aid'. North Korea's human rights record reinforces this argument.

Roughly, debates on North Korea's human rights situation are mostly about the root cause, priority of human rights concerns, type of solution, conditionality of aid and potentiality of reforms in the North. They can be summarized as follows.
The root cause of the problem is the very nature of North Korea's political and economic system, or the very nature of the international isolation and aggression towards the country. The priority of human rights concerns is civil rights and political freedom, or the right to life and freedom from famine. The solution to the problem starts from publicity and pressure to the regime of the North, in other words, by active human rights politics, or from quiet governmental diplomacy restraining politicization of human rights. Humanitarian aid to North Korea should be solidly made on the condition of political reform, or should remain humanitarian in nature, i.e., unconditional. Changes in North Korea should be designed and enforced by political and economic sanctions, or should be induced by providing necessary supportive conditions for its own initiatives for reform. In sum, the nature of the debate is whether we should take considering North Korea's human rights issue as a humanitarian or political one.

Roh Moo-hyun's government chose to be absent when the United Nations Human Rights Commission held a vote and passed a resolution condemning the human rights situation in North Korea in March 2003. Public opinion diverged again in South Korea. One trend was to criticize the government decision and welcome the resolution as a step towards improving the situation in the North. The other trend was to express worry that North Korea's human rights issue was taken out from the larger humanitarian framework and politicized in a way substantially damaging rapprochement of both societies in Korea. In the middle, there were demands to recognize the seriousness of the issue and abstain from political contamination of the issue at the same time.

3. Reflections

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Many North Korea experts in South Korea point out that human rights concerns in the South are inevitably linked with the history of division (the past), the current inter-Korean and international politics in the region (the present), and the new values (the future) sought by the public. As there is no strong majority consensus on these in South Korea, debates will continue and relevant policies will be constrained from different directions.

However, some valuable suggestions have come up among non-governmental groups on ways to ameliorate this gab of public opinion. There is a justified need to engage in much grounded fact-finding work on the actual situation of human rights in North Korea free from politicized allegations. Such work will help prioritize immediate concerns over long-term ones. There is also a need to develop and present feasible programs to improve human rights in the North, which can be implemented in a cooperative manner with North Koreans.

At the same time, human rights agencies and civic groups should develop a set of standards with which the politicization of human rights can be properly curtailed. Using human rights issues for political purposes does more harm than good. Standards should include internationally recognized legal and humanitarian principles regulating human rights and humanitarian activities, such as principles dealing with the issue of conditionality of humanitarian aids. Finally, the issue of peace and ethics of arms race should be given priority for scrutiny in the current situation of grave tension. The effects of militarisation and the arms race have put both Koreas under stringent environment for other matters for decades. Today, this effect is hugely multiplied in its consequences in North Korea. The renewed hard-line and militarist approach of Washington to Northeast Asia manifests deep impact in this regard. Without peace and disarmament efforts being linked to the efforts to improve human rights in North Korea, the internal militarisation within North Korea seems irreversible. Many aspects of
foreign and security policies on North Korea should be reformulated if they are to sincerely deal with issues such as human rights.
Chapter 5

The Problems of the Present National Defense Policy and the Issues Facing the Civil Society

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I. Introduction

The people concerned, so far, have only dealt with national defense and security issues. Professionalism and secretiveness have hindered the intervention of civil society. Despite the fixation of democracy, national defense remains one area that civilian influence cannot reach.

Due to the tensions existing between North and South Korea, any intervention in national defense issues has been considered 'dangerous activity'. As such, any rational debate on national defense issues has been blockaded and swirled up in an attritional Cold War ideological controversy. National defense, as long as the 155-mile truce line exists, remains an exception to the participation of citizens.

However, it is becoming clearer that there is no sacred ground for even national defense or security. For the past few decades, continuing improvements in intra-Korean relations, the democratic maturity and pluralism of the civil society has opened the closely shut area of national defense and allowed the sunshine of citizen's watch into its dark secret.

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It is becoming more difficult to hide the waste and inefficiency of national defense behind the pretext of national division. It is also difficult to rationalize subordinate alliances and increase in armaments using the North Korean threat as an excuse. Furthermore, critical public opinion on bureaucratism and secretiveness in the national defense area is becoming increasingly stronger.

The opening of the military and citizen participation in the decision-making processes, pursued with calls for measures against the Cold War prospects of military bureaucrats who have been justifying attritional competition in military spending, structural reform of the military, the symbol of waste and inefficiency, have become part of the major issues in the citizens’ movements.

II. Problems of the Present National Defense Policy

1. ‘The Military’, the sacred ground for no reform

The Korean society, with the June 10 Democracy Movement of 1987, has seen the growth of a civilian government and subsequent lateral changes in government and through this process, achieved a certain level of structural and procedural democratization. However, in the areas of national defense and security, the special situation, namely, the division of North and South Korea and existing tensions, has distinguished the military from the civilian society as ‘sacred ground.’ Accordingly, the military has been untouched for decades by the demands and movements of reform in other social areas, and due to such circumstances, problems are becoming more prominent.

In 2003 alone, newspapers reported almost daily news on suspicious deaths, sexual violence, beatings, etc, taking place in the military, very
different from the social developments occurring in the outside world. As is the case with the rotting of still water, bribery and personnel corruption within the military have reached the same alarming heights as in politics. In 2000, according to the material released by Representative Lee, Giu-taek during a national audit hearing, the average amount of bribes received by officials in the military was ten times more than that of ordinary public officials. The necessity of citizens’ watch over the reforms on the waste and inefficiency of the military is becoming more and more urgent. The misuse of ‘professionalism’ and ‘secretiveness’ by military bureaucrats is no longer persuasive.

2. The Exaggerated North Korean Threat

The reason why the military did not receive criticism as ‘sacred ground’ was due to the existence of the exaggerated North Korean threat. The Ministry of National Defense claims that the South Korean military is weaker than the North Korean military by taking bean-count and strategic index comparisons as the pretext. However, the quality and performance of weapons were not taken into consideration and so, an insufficient and twisted image of South Korean military capability was presented. For instance, the South Korean Navy has fewer boats (160 to North Korea’s 430, the white Paper 2000) in terms of bean-count comparisons, but North Korean boats are only patrol boats weighing less than 100 tons. The difference in the naval power between South and North Korea was confirmed during the crossfire in the west coast last year. In terms of air power, what is more important is not the number of aircraft but the number of take-offs and endurance flights undertaken. And since North Korea suffers from a lack of oil, North Korean jet fighter pilots have far less hours of training than South Korean pilots. Furthermore, North Korean fighter jets are MIG-15/17 models used during
the Korean War, which are much outdated in comparison with the highly sophisticated F-15K models of the South Korean military.

In addition, on the aspect of military spending encompassing human, material and organizational resources, which is the most important basis for military capacity, South Korea has bypassed North Korea since the end of the 1970s and the disparity is growing larger. South Korean military spending exceeded that of North Korea in 1976 and 1977, and in investment and maintenance expenses, South Korea overtook North Korea in the years between 1978 and 1982. In the past 10 years of foreign weapons acquisition, South Korea spent a total of 127 billion dollars while North Korea spent 3.5 billion dollars (Ministry of National Defense estimate), a 37-fold disparity between the two countries. It is also known that North Korea has not built any of the latest fighter jets or aircraft carriers. As can be seen, it can no longer be denied that the so-called North Korean threat, completely monopolized by the South Korean military, has been exaggerated to a certain extent. Thus, the contention of the South Korean military that it is weaker in strength to the North Korean military, the excessive increases in military spending, and the reason for the compulsory stationing of US troops, no longer remains persuasive.

3. National Defense Strategy Based on ‘Deterrence’

The security policies of North and South Korea are based on the policy of deterrence established during the Cold War. The policy of deterrence confirms that the dangers and expenses of invasionary actions are greater than the profits earned through such actions and has the intention of making the other party abandon any invasionary actions planned (United Nations, Department for Disarmament Affairs 1986, 6). Deterrence is not established on trust or mutual cooperation but on distrust and requires the
sacrifice of the other party and is a `zero sum game', with the purpose of ensuring the security of a country. It naturally follows that this situation could end up in extreme confrontation, the vicious cycle of arms competition, i.e., in a security dilemma.

A. The fiction of the `predominant supremacy strategy' against the North Korean threat

South Korea is pursuing a strategy of `absolute deterrence' in order to maintain its predominant supremacy over North Korea. For this purpose, the Ministry of National Defense is pursuing plans to spend a total of 55 trillion won in the next five years to increase military capacity and comprehensive efforts have also been undertaken to achieve increases in the military budget. However, a close examination of the topographical features of the Korean Peninsula and the military structure of North and South Korea reveals that the predominant supremacy strategy has little practical value and is feared to only accelerate the security crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

Considering the short geographical length of the Korean Peninsula and the proximity of the cities to the truce line, an all-out war can only be accompanied by damages to property and human lives. Recently, the military structures of North and South Korea have taken on the character of an unsymmetrical arms race. North Korea has been facing an economic crisis since the 1990s and has, in all reality, abandoned the arms race in conventional weapons. However, South Korea, with more economic power, has continued to pursue a continuous project for building up military capacity. Consequently, North Korea, which has adopted a defense policy based on deterrence just like South Korea, has changed its strategy to a strategy centering on weapons of mass destruction, including missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, etc. Therefore, if North and South
Korea continue to pursue national defense policies based on deterrence, this unsymmetrical arms race would be accelerated, leading to the increase in military tensions and serious security threats.

B. The fiction behind the `limited defense sufficiency' against potential threats

With the North Korean threat, another reason cited for justifying the arms race is the 'potential threat of neighboring countries'. With improvements in intra-Korean relations and the disparity of military and economic capabilities between North and South Korea, the so-called North Korean threat is lowering its head and the 'theory of potential threat' is being used to rationalize the direction of the existing arms race and deterrence policy. According to the 'theory of potential threat', there is no lasting patron or enemy in international relations, and in regions like East Asia, where there is a concentration of superpowers, there is a need to maintain an adequate level of military power in order to protect the peace on the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, the potential threat of neighboring countries would continue to exist even with the disappearance of the North Korean threat, and so, for the security of a future reunified Korea, 'limited defense capacity' must be attained.

However, 'potential threat' remains ambiguous. The Ministry of National Defense has not revealed whether the 'potential threat' is Japan, China, or even comprehensively the US. To understand the situation through 'strategic ambiguity', which is applied to security matters, is difficult as there are too many imaginary enemies. Furthermore, the deterrent policy on the 'potential threat' called 'limited defense sufficiency' is also ambiguous. That is, while 'absolute deterrence' is pursued against the North Korean threat, the policy of 'limited defense sufficiency' is applied to counter the 'potential threat' of
neighboring countries. What ‘limited defense’ is remains unclear. The US applies this concept to the establishment of MD systems. The MD strategy is a very aggressive concept which asserts that “even if the attacks by missile warheads cannot be prevented, most would be counterattacked and an attack on the enemy undertaken.” It is not clear if the Ministry of National Defense has taken ‘limited defense’ to mean an operations strategy, but it is definitely not the concept of ‘rational defense sufficiency’ strategy based on arms control and disarmament.

‘Limited defense’ is linked with the strategy of the ‘absolute defense’ of 500 km, outlined in the National Defense Basic Policy Paper. This meant reprisals against any enemy attacks within 500 km of the Korean Peninsula. The South Korean military has been upgraded with highly sophisticated weapons to satisfy the needs for high operations to ‘protect the right of absolute defense.’ This cannot be viewed just as the acquisition of up-to-date weapons but is more ‘expansionist’ in character - increase in the existing conventional military capacity, which in turn can create wariness in the neighboring countries including North Korea.

However, if a competitive arms race takes place in East Asia, the Korean Peninsula would be in a most difficult position. So, it is more advisable if regional arms reduction and control were to be undertaken instead of inducing arms competition.

C. Introduction of the Structure of Offensive Strategy and High-Tech Weapons, & MD

The focus of South Korea’s deterrent strategy against North Korea is an offensive strategy centering on the South Korea-US military alliance and the concept of air land battle, with the aim of replacing the North Korean structure. The air land battle will comprise simultaneously of the ‘forward
battle' and 'deep battle' strategies. Strategy 5027 of the South Korea-US Joint Command, the strategic framework of the South Korean military denies 'pre-emptive strikes', but in content, has gone beyond simple defense and has taken on a very offensive character. It is needless to say that the North Korean military policy and strategies have also been evaluated as being offensive in character. These offensive strategies could lead small scuffles into the possibility of an all-out confrontation. Furthermore, offensive strategies could also unnecessarily stimulate the other party, growing into an exhaustive arms race.

Therefore, following this strategy, the South Korean military has introduced offensive weapons to enhance its military capacity. However, most of North Korean air fighter jets are those used during the Korean War and the South Koreans have introduced F-16 jets that would give them dominance over the skies. In spite of these developments, the South Korean military is being upgraded with the introduction of F-15s to be used in air land battles. The South Korean military is spending trillions of won to promote the K-1 tank up-gun project and the introduction of the Apache helicopters. These offensive weapons can only irritate the other party and in cases of disarmament, these would be the first to be targeted. As such, astronomical amounts of the people's taxes need not be spent on the introduction of offensive weapons, which are unnecessary and only add to the escalation of tension.

On the other hand, the Ministry of National Defense, in order to protect its 'right of absolute defense' outlined in the 'National Defense Policy Paper' has been introducing high-tech weaponry to enhance the expansion of conventional military capacity. In addition to F-15K, aerial refueling tanker planes and massive landing craft (Aegis) are also being introduced. The Ministry of National Defense has plans to spend 1.2 trillion won on the introduction of four aerial refueling tanker planes and one trillion won on
LPX (massive landing craft). The introduction of such weaponry would lead to the expansion of military operations into Japan, China and Russia, and it is highly probable this would evoke the opposition of these countries. This has actually been the case of Japan when it started the construction of a massive landing craft, evoking severe opposition from other countries. The massive landing craft introduced by the navy is one that could be converted into a light aircraft carrier with functions for the possible operation of vertical take-off and landing craft (VTOL).

What is becoming most problematic is the weapons system related to missile defense (MD). MD related weapons are widely known as defensive weapons but are, in reality, offensive weapons, making possible attacks on the enemy without being attacked. South Korea has not confirmed its participation in MD but has clarified its intention for the construction of the South Korean-type missile defense system and the introduction of AEGIS carriers, Standard missiles, AWACS, PAC-3, etc, to increase information-gathering capacity. However, most of these weapons are needed as subsystems for the Korean Peninsula to be part of the MD system and since they are not needed as effective deterrent measures against North Korea, suspicions can only be aroused as to the actual purpose of the introduction of these weapons. Major North Korean offensive weapons against South Korea are not ballistic missiles but are long-range missiles and anti-interceptor Prog missiles. Therefore, PAC-3 and other high-tech missiles are not needed to counter the North Korean threat. However, if the introduction of these weapons are linked with the US missile defense system against China, this could escalate an arms race in East Asia and the Korean Peninsula would become a forward base of the US military to counter China, and this situation would, in turn, increase the security crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

D. Excessive Defense Budget Needed
The deterrent strategy, the cause of an unnecessary arms race, has led to an excessive increase in defense spending. The South Korean defense expenditures have far exceeded the adequate level of spending. Until 1994, defense expenditures have taken up the largest single share of the national budget. Although the amount has decreased somewhat, it still takes up 16.3% (2003 standards) of the national budget. However, demands in the increases in the national budget are expected to continue.

Excessive defense expenditures have led to abnormal budget allocations in a limited budget. The defense budget has been pointed out as a main reason for preventing increases in budget allocations for education, social welfare, and economic growth. This excessive waste in defense expenditures is a more serious problem for North Korea to resolve rather than South Korea. Although it has not been officially confirmed, it has been estimated that North Korea spends 30% (Ministry of National Defense statistics) of its budget on military expenditures. Considering the seriousness of the North Korean economic crisis, it is an issue that must be resolved with urgency.

When explaining its reasons for the necessity of defense budget increases, the Ministry of National Defense cites that the average military spending per GDP in the world is 3.5% and in countries threatened with potential conflicts, the average spending is 6.7% per GDP but the South Korean military spending rates is at 2.7% per GDP, lower than the average world rate and abysmal compared to the average of countries threatened with potential conflicts.

However, the world average and the average of countries threatened with potential conflicts are based on NATO computations but the rate cited of 2.7% per GDP of the South Korean defense budget, is based on the Ministry of National Defense general accounts budget and has been arbitrarily computed by the South Korean government. So the comparisons are just
figures fabricated to highlight the so-called relative insufficiencies of the South Koran defense budget. If the South Korean defense budget is computed along NATO lines, it is estimated to exceed 3% per GDP. According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2003 \(^2\), the average world defense budget has been estimated at 2.5%, and if the United States is excluded, this average falls to an average of 1.43%. Therefore, using the world defense average of 3.5% as cited in the Military Balance published by the US government, as a basis for stipulating that the South Korean defense spending is lower than the world average, loses all plausibility.

In 1998, the Korea Development Institute (KDI) proposed the reduction of 6 trillion Won annually to set up measures for the restructuring of the financial industries, unemployment and poverty. The South Korean economy is still in the midst of difficulties and may be facing a budget deficit and so any demands for increases in the defense budget can only be seen as unreasonable. It is especially so in the face of future astronomical expenses related to reunification and even at the present, the preparation of funds for the immediate intra-Korean economic cooperation is not easy. There are no other ways except to reduce the defense spending of North and South Korea.

4. Inefficient Organization of National Defense

A. Over-concentration of military troops & the solidification of the pro-security forces

The number of the South Korean military is estimated to be 690,000 strong. That is 140 men out of 10,000 men, eight times bigger than the Japanese military which is estimated to be 19 men out of 10,000. This shows one aspect of the inefficient organization of South Korean military. This inefficiency is also reflected directly in the defense budget. 67% (2003 standards) of the budget is used to cover operational costs, meaning that a
massive amount of the defense budget is spent to cover the wages of the military troops.

The possession of massive military troops not only leads to the inefficient organization of the military, but also leads to the possible expansion of pro-security forces. These forces possess and manage great resources, prefer the escalation of tensions to continue their influence, and have a tendency to prolong Cold War-style confrontational logic. Therefore, an excessive possession of military troops leads to inefficient execution of national defense, increases in defense spending, and in the long run, the solidification of pro-security force influence, and a vicious cycle hindering the peace on the Korean Peninsula.

B. The Necessity of Troop Reduction

The South Korean military has an obsolete military organization that over-emphasizes the land forces. Under this inefficient military organization, increases in the military budget would only solidify the over-expanded military organization and this would, in turn, become a factor for further increases in military spending. The existing poor standards of welfare of the troops would not be resolved without the reform of the structure of the military.

Troop reductions are expected to be an important opportunity for building trust between North and South Korea and the realization of peace on the Korean Peninsula. If disarmament between North and South Korea were to take place, the foremost item on the agenda would be the reduction of troops. It is highly probable that North Korea, facing an economic crisis, could show a change in position under certain conditions. The Ministry of National Defense has clarified that at the present stage of tensions with North Korea, the existing number of troops would be maintained but in times of peace,
under the agreement with North Korea, troops reduction would be carried out. However, it is necessary that the Ministry of National Defense take on a new initiative to troop reduction since this could lead to the quickening of the period of peace.

C. `Reform of the Military Structure' Leading to Troop Expansion

Most advanced countries are pursuing decisive plans for troop reductions or have completed the process in order to create a more efficient military. In 1989, the US carried out step-by-step plans for troop retrenchment from 2.13 million to 1.38 million while Russia in 2000, started plans to reduce its troops from 1.2 million to one-third of this number by 2005, to 850,000, almost no different from the number of South Korean troops. China has also reduced its troops by 1.5 million to the present 2.5 million troops and has plans to further reduce its troops by another 500,000 by the year 2005.

The Ministry of National Defense, with the inauguration of the `people's government', has promised the `creation of a small but strong military' and the radical reform of the military. Promises were made to unify the 1st and 3rd Field Command Headquarters into a single Ground Command Headquarters and the dismantling of two army corps under the control of two armies, one special brigade and a few mobilized divisions. The unification of the Field Command Headquarters composed of a commander, a major general and a brigadier general and the dismantling of non-essential bases, etc, are significant military reforms. Also in 1999, the present 690,000 troops would be reduced to about 400,000 to 500,000 troops by the year 2015, showing the intention of military reform to the public.

However, the military reforms proposed by the Ministry of National Defense have taken a change for the worse. Unlike the initial promises of making an efficient military organization by reducing the size of the military,
no measures have been carried out to do so. In fact, an increase of 90,000 troops was made on the pretext of absorbing unemployed labor with the onset of the IMF economic crisis. Expectations on the unification of the field headquarters and the dismantling of unnecessary bases were abated because the command & control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) system has not yet been established and also on the reason that ‘Operation Plan 5027’ is based on the 1st and 3rd Army systems. Furthermore, the Naval Operations Command, the size of an army corps and the National Army Command for CBR Protection, the National Army Transport Command, the Air force Medical Evacuation Unit, etc, were established and increased the number of bases and military personnel, earning the condemnation of the public.

These plans were undertaken when the whole nation was suffering from the pains of reform due to the IMF crisis. It was only the military that remained sacred ground, excluded from the demands and trends of reform existing in all sectors of society.

D. Recklessness of the Military Industry & the Closed Structure of Weapons

Introduction

On the other hand, the inefficiency and waste on the pretext of a `self-reliant national defense' becomes clearer with the reckless operation of military industries since the 1970s. From the 1970s, under the dictatorship of President Park Chung Hee, an array of policies and systems were legislated and executed in the name of a `self-reliant national defense' and the `local production of weapons', and this `Yulgok Project', a long term project for improving military power, has continued to this day. `Yulgok’ was a scholar from the Chosun Dynasty who advocated the building up of a 100,000-strong military just prior to the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592.
Since President Park Chung Hee, military industries, in the name of the local production of weapons and the establishment of a state on the basis of technology, have been supported by the ‘special law for the promotion of the defense industries’ and have enjoyed monopolistic special privileges. The ‘special law for the promotion of the defense industries’ has guaranteed the monopolistic development of military industries and has allowed the affiliation and specialization of these industries while the costs of materials, overhead expenses, costs of development, wages, and all other expenses were to be post-paid, thereby guaranteeing a fixed rate of profit. Accordingly, these military industries, in the name of the local development of weapons, had the privilege of a stable market, with the cost price guaranteed. Furthermore, for reasons of national security and national division, there has been no transparent monitoring of these military industries, which have become a hotbed of every kind of corruption and connections. Consequently, all Korean conglomerates possess, whether arbitrarily or not, many different subsidiaries of military industries.

Such special privileges and loose ethics have led to the growth of an insolvent military industry. For example, from the time of President Park Chung Hee to President Roh Tae Woo, all former military men who became presidents, the K-1 tank project, so praised as the symbol of the growth of the Korean military industry, was later found to have been only the simple assembly (wiring and housing) of imported parts from the US and Europe. However, even today, the government insists that this tank is a solely local production, made possible with the spending of high costs of development and profits. In this situation, military industries felt no need for efforts in developing products or immense investments in production facilities or establishing companies to produce parts. Factories for the assembly of simple finished products were enough to create higher profits than the importation and marketing of fully furnished products. Unlike the US, the
accumulation of technology in the military industries did not have a spin-off effect in the private sector, going against the ‘fantasy of the dictators.’ The US limitations on the transfer of sophisticated technology were another barrier. In reality, prior to the IMF bailout, there were four insolvent enterprises in the aerospace industry that existed solely on the sale of their products to the military. Two of these enterprises have merged and grown into a chronic insolvent enterprise and if it had not been for special military orders, these enterprises would not have been unable to survive on the production of goods for civilian use. There are growing concerns that the recently announced Korea Multi-Purpose Helicopter (KMH) development project, a 30-trillion won project, would be another mismanaged national project which would lead to the fostering of insolvent enterprises.

As such, the so-called ‘Yulgok Project’, the project to reform the Korean military in the long run, has only led to mismanagement and wasteful expenditures. If the untransparent system of weapons purchasing in the name of national defense, is problematic, then the preponderance of US agents for weapons purchase, in the name of US-South Korean military alliance, has provided the basis of further insolvency and wastefulness. Therefore, massive weapons transactions became linked with political connections and corruption. On the other hand, the choice in weapons purchase was limited due to US pressure, leaving room for controversy ‘over adequateness of the purchase’ and ‘squandering of funds’. As a result, the ‘Yulgok Project’ has lost all legitimacy over long-term prospects and strategies and led to the erratic purchase of poor quality weapons, which had no interrelation with other weapons.

The ‘new generation fighter jet project’ is such an example. Towards the end of the 1980s, South Korea approached the US for the purchase of F-15 new generation fighter jets but the US rejected technology transfer as well as
the purchase. South Korea was left with the option of purchasing either F-18 or F-16 fighter jets. But even this did not turn out well for the South Korean government. The air force had preferred the purchase of the high-tech and multi-purpose F-18 but due to political pressures (later known as the "Yulgok corruption case"), it had to select the purchase of F-16 fighter jets and assembly production. In the end, the air force had to wait another 10 years in 2000, to pursue its new generation fighter jet project but by then, the production of F-15 jets was coming to an end, and F-15 jets were already being classified as outdated. However, the US forced the purchase of F-15 jets and despite the merits of other sophisticated European models, the South Korean government purchased 40 F-15 jets based on doubtful standards of evaluation. During the process, Flight Colonel Jo, Ju-hyong, in charge of coordinating the purchase for the air force, went public on the problems related to the purchase but he was demoted to the rank of a second-class airman and was imprisoned for making his suspicions heard. But the problem lies in the fact that the air force had to purchase other models of fighter jets in 10 years’ time. By that time, the production of F-15 fighter jets would have stopped and the jets losing whatever competitiveness it had.

III. Measures for the Reform of National Defense Based on Peace Perspectives & the Role of the Civil Society

1. Dissolution of Secretiveness & the Monopolistic Analysis of Threats
The defense sector still remains as "sacred ground" in South Korean society. The reason for the difficulty in implementing reforms is due to "secretiveness." Secretiveness has closed all civilian participation and monitoring of the defense sector. In addition, secretiveness has been linked to the "monopolistic analysis of threats," the basis for demands in the increases in the defense budget and military capacity. Therefore, the
movement for the public release of information in the defense and security sectors must take precedence over others.

The present system on military secrets is based on the regulations concerning the maintenance of security matters or delegated legislation with excessive powers which arbitrarily determines the classification and the abstract and wide system of military secrets. This runs counter to the ‘right to knowledge’ of the public. Even the US, which feels a greater security threat has a ‘sunshine regulation’, permitting the lowering of the information status and the subsequent disclosure of classified information after a certain period of time. Thus, the contention of the Ministry of Defense on the necessity of a wide range of regulations regarding military secrets based on the potential North Korean threat is longer persuasive to the public.

So in order to avoid the abuses of the existing military secrets regulations, a new law must be enacted to control the arbitrary designation of military secrets and to release military secrets for the knowledge of the public. And the regulations on secrets must be imposed not by the directives of the Minister of Defense but by an enforcement ordinance or presidential directive. There must also be regulations on the preservation and adequate termination of designated secrets. A separate agency must be set up to re-evaluate previously designated secrets and must be re-classified. And civilian participation must be guaranteed to increase the independence and objectivity of the agency.

2. Reform of the Military Structure Under the Guidance of the Civil Society

A comprehensive reform of the military structure is needed especially in the areas of military troops and personnel, weapons introduction and increase in military capacity, human rights and justice. And such reforms cannot be left
in the hands of the bureaucratic military leadership but must take place under the control and participation of civilians. And the process and procedures must result in the opening of the military to the public.

The main issues concerning military troops and personnel are: the reform of the land forces-centered inefficient structure and troops reduction; the retrenchment of the reserve troops and sub-military units; limiting the excess number of officers and merging unnecessary military organizations; the monopolistic control by specific classes within the military, etc. and in the long run; and the fundamental reform of the conscription system into a system of voluntary enlistment must also be taken into careful consideration.

The foremost barrier to the reform of the military lies in the privileged classes within the military. Most of the personnel in the policy-making Ministry of National Defense and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff are former army personnel and most of the important positions within the military are filled by graduates of the Korea Military Academy, showing that the present military structure is inductive to the growth of a privileged class within the military. This type of army-centered personnel preponderance hinders the execution of effective defense policies and the implementation of defense policies and budget allocation, and the process of weapons purchase are influenced by the cliquishness of army-related connections instead of rational decision-making.

There is always strong internal resistance to reform. The decision taken in 1998 on the reform measures by the Military Reform Committee of the Ministry of National Defense, shows clearly the response to reform measures. The reform of this type of closed character of the military necessitates the appointment of a civilian to the post of Minister of Defense. Except for brief periods during the Rhee Syngman Administration
(1948~1960), military men have filled all Ministers of Defense. However in
the US, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Canada and other advanced
nations, civilians are appointed to the post of Minister of Defense.

In the purchasing of weapons, in projects for increasing military capacity,
military industries and defense spending, civilian and market control are
necessary. Weapons-related projects have been the hotbed for wasteful
spending and inefficiency. The citizens' movements against the over-
computation of the prime cost of the parts of K1 tanks, the untransparent bid
for F-15K, the speedy promotion of KMH, and other erratic support and
promotion of weapons transactions and military industries and subsequent
insolvency, can all be classified as case studies. In addition, demands are
made for reforms to be undertaken on the erratic policies promoting military
industries and the closed procedures for weapons purchase, and calls are
made for standards of transparency and market competitiveness to be applied
on both corporate and government contracts.

Another important pillar for increased civilian participation in the military is
in the reform of the human rights situation and guaranteeing objectivity in
the application of military law. The human rights movement has continued
since the movements of democratization in the 1980s and works to set up
measures to resolve physical violence and assault, abusive language and
sexual violence and calls for transparent and fair justice in the resolution of
these cases. However, reforms are slow in coming. The recent campaigns for
alternative military training for conscientious objectors are part of
movements for the human rights reforms in the military. Under the
conscription system, the freedoms of religion and conscience have been
severely oppressed for the past 50 years.

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For the reform of corruption and human rights within the military, the reform of military law remains urgent and cannot be delayed any longer. Issues in military law occur because military prosecutors and judges are not free from the orders of their commanding officers or their ranks during the course of their work. Reforms must include: guarantees of work independence for military prosecutors; guarantees of fairness by military judges and abolition of the right of confirmation by officers in jurisdiction; and the necessity in the reduction of cases to be brought to military tribunals and expansion of cases to the regular courts. What is urgently needed is the change in the basic awareness that the existing military legal system is a tool guaranteeing the right of command, the means of exercising the right of command in times of war.

3. Restructuring of the Peace-oriented Discourse & Disarmament

For a more fundamental approach into military reform, it is urgent that the civil society comes up with an alternative peace plan, instead of depending on state-oriented security strategy. The present defense strategy based on deterrence must be re-evaluated. The security dilemma which focuses on an excessive arms race of the Cold War, with the belief that weapons could be used to deter the enemy, must be overcome. The concept of a 'common security', a consistent peace strategy based on co-existence and mutual dependence, is necessary.

For the introduction of the concept of a 'common security', an overhaul of the mutual distrust, confrontational concepts, and the framework of the present alliance structures, is also compulsory. It is also urgent to enhance awareness of the need of a multi-party security guarantee system, and mutual disarmament to replace the growing aggressiveness (the US-Japan military
expansion since the advent of the Bush Administration), the new US-Japan-South Korea triple alliance, and stop the growth of a new Cold War order.

Conditions are not ripe for discussions on disarmament due to the tensions surrounding the North Korean nuclear issue, but promises of denuclearisation, non-aggression, military confidence building and cooperation have been reached through the Basic Agreement in 1991. For the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem, preparations for disarmament are felt to be belated. According to the survey carried out in 1999 by the Korean Council for Reunification and Cooperation (KCRC), 59.1% agreed to disarmament while 36.9% answered in the negative. The political conditions were more agreeable towards disarmament since the survey was undertaken during the North and South Korean reconciliatory mood and the IMF economic crisis. However, this survey has made it clear that discourse on disarmament, the sphere of a small number of activists, can be popularized. Discussions on disarmament of the Korean Peninsula will have a paramount influence on the lessening of military tensions in the region. The peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the formation of a framework for multi-party talks could be useful in the establishment of a structure of peace in East Asia and for regional disarmament.

Furthermore, in order to be free from Cold War security strategies, there must be changes in logic and policy as well as in the diversification of actors in charge of security. The obvious male chauvinism and professionalism in the military sector must be fought. Opportunities for civilian participation and intervention, especially participation of women and especially housewives, must be guaranteed. Defense and security are not abstract matters but are closely linked with our common futures and everyday lives. These matters are not to be designed by a few dignified and noble people but
must be the results of a collective action of wisdom and measures to make our lives more sustainable.

References


The Reality Behind South Korea-US Alliance

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1. How to Analyze South Korea-US Alliance

The South Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty was concluded on the basis of 'common threat awareness' between South Korea and the US. However, the process of conclusion was not fair and the South Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty was signed with the US passively agreeing to the demands of South Korea. Based on the treaty, the withdrawal or retrenchment of troops became a leverage for the US in maintaining flexibility in the alliance while flexing its influence on the South Korean government. Even recently, the US used the repositioning of the 2nd Infantry Division to influence South Korean policies on the US. During the Cold War, the South Korean government attempted to include in the defense treaty a clause of 'automatic intervention' in times of emergency as well as a clause defining mutual agreement over the withdrawal of US troops. Furthermore, the South Korean government attempted to exchange stronger cohesion in South Korea-US
alliance with the dispatch of troops to Vietnam. Thus, the history of South Korea-US relations can only be summarized as a ‘patron-client’ relationship.

In such historical conditions, South Korea-US alliance continued in a unique way whereby security and autonomy are exchanged with the transfer of operational rights during the course of the war. As such, despite the increase in state capacity and the changes in the international political environment, the South Korean autonomy, the lowest unit in the alliance, did not immediately get augmented.

In order to analyze ‘actively’ the South Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty, the main point of the treaty to be emphasized is “until the development of a more comprehensive and effective organization to guarantee regional security in the Pacific region.” That is, if a regional security framework were to be established in the Pacific region, the South Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty would be reformed or scrapped. The post-Cold War era demands the re-structuring of the South Korea-US alliance.

2. Reforming the South Korea-US Alliance

The reasons for the restructuring of South Korea-US alliance must be distinguished from the structural reasons of the international systems and the restructuring of the interests and preferences based on the changes in awareness of the players. Structural reasons on the international scale meant the dismantling of the Cold War, the simultaneous progress of both the Cold War and post-Cold War structures and the alleviation of tensions between North and South Korea. On the level of the players, there are changes in awareness with the lessening of a common threat due to the dismantling of the Cold War. And as democracy develops in South Korea, anti-US criticism

from civil society grew stronger. Furthermore, the civil society in the US is also changing. These changes within South Korea and the US have also called for the restructuring of South Korea-US alliance.


The future of South Korea-US alliance has been outlined in three directions: first, the maintaining of the existing South Korea-US alliance; second, lateral or equal relations; and third, improvements into “fair relations”. It is clear that the second and third measures weaken the solidarity and cohesion of the alliance. Whether it is the maintenance of the existing mode of South Korea-US alliance or gradual evolution, or essential reform, would be decided according to the relationships and alliances of the internal and international `social powers.' Another issue related in connection to the South Korea-US alliance is the US-Japan alliance and the connection with the multi-party security cooperation in East Asia.

With the dismantling of the Cold War and taking the unsymmetrical and hierarchical structure of the South Korea-US alliance, the politics of alliance of East Asian countries based on the new US strategy, emerged as the biggest variable in the restructuring of South Korea-US alliance. The choice of the US has the potential of becoming a structural pressure limiting the range in choice of South Korea.

To understand the political environment in the East Asia and the security situation of South Korea after the Cold War, there must be an understanding of the global strategy of the US government and the international political ideology underlying it. After the Cold War, the US was more interested in maximizing its interests rather than seeking a balance of power in the new
world order. The world order appears to progress into a US-controlled unipolar hegemonic system. During the US invasion of Iraq, Germany and France, US NATO allies made the choice of balance in regard to their political and economic interests but with the unexpected early termination of the war, both countries are now making efforts to align themselves with the US. In the post-Cold War era, a neo-conservatist organization called the 'Project for the New American Century' (PNAC) was formed in 1997 which rationalizes in theory the US global strategy and protects and rallies support for the global hegemony and global strategy of the US.

With the disappearance of the visible threat of the Soviet Union, the US could change military alliances and its policy of balance based on the forward positioning of its troops. However, the US did not change its hegemonic policies of the Cold War era. Both the Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration did not choose military reductions. The idea that only US 'leadership' can alleviate the instability in the world and that global instability similar to that of the 1920s would emerge if the US did not intervene, despite the disappearance of a visible threat, continued even after the collapse of the Cold War.

The Clinton Administration inaugurated in 1996 announced “the end of the Cold War” and started to concretize the

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2 This organization was formed in 1997. First formed by internationalists of the US Democratic Party and selected the following goals to protect US global hegemony. First, the modernization of military capacity and a greater increase in the military budget. Second, strengthening solidarity among democratic nations and countering enemies against US values and interests. Third, promoting the principles of political and economic freedoms abroad. Fourth, to create a global order friendly to US security, prosperity, and values. Joongang Daily, May 27, 2003.

3 However, that is not to say that the US government carried out hegemonic-oriented policies continuously after the Cold War. During the Clinton Administration, from 1995 to 1999, a total of 1 trillion dollars was cut from the military budget. Meaning that the US global strategy after the Cold War was not consistent and is sometimes evaluated as going from “blockade to confusion”. R. Hass, "Paradigm Lost," Foreign Affairs, (January-February 1995).
strategies of “intervention and expansion”. New "rogue states" were announced to replace the Soviet Union, the ‘revolution in military affairs,’ (RMA) was rationalized in the name of preventive defense⁴. According to the Quadrennial Defense Review, (QDR) published in May 1997 and September 2001, the US global strategy has been defined as “intervention and war”⁵. Consequently, the Clinton Administration undertook the Bosnian and the Kosovo wars while the Bush Administration carried out the Afghan and Iraqi wars. However, there is no difference in the US Democratic or Republican parties. The former prefers multi-lateralism while the former, ‘unilateralism’⁶. However, differences have weakened considerably after 9.11. The Bush Administration has nullified multi-lateral preventive diplomacy and introduced the concept of ‘preventive war’, and has publicly announced the use of pre-emptive strikes as part of legitimate self-defense. The global strategy of the US is closely connected to the transformation of the US economy into one of neo-liberalism⁷. The 2001 QDR clarifies that the new military strategy of the US is to support its economic interests. The US invasion of Iraq is hard to explain without considering the economic interests, i.e, to secure oil resources. In the case of the US economy entering into an economic depression, the US might revert to a ‘permanent war

⁶ The Clinton Administration used international organizations as the medium to carry out hegemonic strategies. Their principles are ‘commercial liberalism’, ‘Democratic peace, and structural liberalism’. On the other hand, the Republicans pursue a balance of power in ‘defensive realism’ and goes a step further in understanding the continuous pursuit of hegemony and select ‘offensive realism’ as normal.
economy’ to promote economic growth. The US ‘new economy’, which had reached great heights, is showing signs of slowing down. Therefore, the military tensions led by the US globally are connected to economics, to a certain level.

The US military reform has been cemented into the so-called missile defense system (MD), aiming to achieve absolute military supremacy as a hegemonic state. This strategy of the US has been escalated into a 21st century-style security dilemma after 9.11 and led to increases in armaments under the pretext of ‘war against terrorism’.\(^8\) Also with the expansion of the missile defense system, allies are being integrated into the military network controlled by the US. With the weakening of the common threat, the US alliance strategy, instead of transforming into lateral relationships, has vertically restructured to achieve the interests of the US.

After the Cold War, the character of the US alliance with its main allies, NATO and Japan has been changing. With the disappearance of a common threat, the alliances with NATO and Japan have been strengthened. A transformation from unsymmetrical relations to symmetrical relations and the purpose of the alliance has been changed from war deterrence to management of regional stability and conflicts, prevention, resolution, etc. For example, the US-Japan alliance, similar to South Korea-US alliance, is evaluated as being transformed into the position of a strategic partner with the US-Japan New Security Declaration in 1996 and the New Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation released in 1997. Changes in the US-Japan alliance is analyzed by scholars not as the alliance flexibility, but as the

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\(^8\) The US defense budget for 2004 is 399.1 billion dollars. The budget for MD is 9.1 billion dollars. The US aims to increase the defense budget by 502.7 billion dollars in 2009. During the Cold War, the total ratio of defense spending of the US and NATO members was 5:3, now the figure is at 5:2 and by 2007, it is expected that the defense spending of the US will be greater than the total defense spending of all the countries in the world combined.
strengthening’ of the alliance.9 The strengthening of the alliance would probably make Japan ‘an ordinary state’ or a ‘normal state’, leading very highly to the collective display of self-defense capacities. On the other hand, it is highly probable that the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance would be promoted in the direction of a vertical military network. The US and Japan are already in the midst of a common research on MD. In the US-Japan Summit Meeting in May 2003, the US and Japan had agreed on Japan to be part of MD system. The US has plans to station MD in actual warfare by September 2004 and Japanese Defense Office is looking at plans to introduce aircraft ballistic missiles that could be fired from the Aegis carriers and the anti-ballistic missile, the Patriot.10

The US strategy on East Asia can be read in the restructuring of US-Japan alliance, central in East Asian alliance politics. Where the balance of power has deteriorated, the purpose of the US in East Asia is to effectively manage expansionist China and the “rogue state” North Korea. There are two ways of achieving this.11 First, to find the reasons for the potential security instability of East Asia and the formation of a structural framework of multi-lateral security cooperation to alleviate the root of the problem. Second, to search for the reasons of potential security instability in the balance of power and to achieve deterrence in an alliance strategy for the prevention and management the instability. And the restructuring of the US-Japan alliance seems to have taken on the latter purpose.12 This can be summarized as ‘formal equality’ in the alliance and ‘realistic subordination’.

12 One dissertation describes the US-Japan alliance as an ‘alliance of security dilemma.’ For example, if Japan were to pursue balanced changes in relations with China and the US, this could
The US strategy for the future of South Korea-US alliance can be predicted through the US-Japan alliance. As can be seen from the 2001 edition of QDR and from the restructuring of the US-Japan alliance, the threat-based model of alliances of the Cold War must be transformed into capabilities-based models. So the South Korea-US alliance could become a replica of the US-Japan alliance. From the US perspective, it appears as if the US is providing stronger alliances, but it appears that the US prefers 'formal equality' rather than a security dilemma. After the South Korea-US Summit Meeting, US policy-makers promised 11 billion dollars over the period of 4 years to increase the military capabilities of the US troops stationed in South Korea. Furthermore, South Korea is demanding an increase in military spending in line with these changes. The defense budget, 'only' 2.7% of the GDP, is considered miniscule. South Korean participation in MD has not yet been confirmed but South Korea-US alliance would be restructured along the lines of the US-Japan alliance. If South Korea participates in MD, the withdrawal or retrenchment of US troops in South Korea would be possible.

If South Korea-US alliance is restructured on US demands, it is highly probable that a new Cold War structure in East Asia, centering on deterrence against China, could be formed. The US has defined China as a 'strategic competitor' progressing from a 'strategic partner'. At the present, China poses no visible threat to the US. However, considering the promotion of MD by the US, the expanding trends for the independence of Taiwan, and the strengthening of US-Japan alliance, China is also contemplating a new foreign security strategy. The 'theory of security development' aiming at the
The simultaneous strengthening of economic and military capabilities has internally\textsuperscript{13} developed into the so-called “big nation new security strategy”. The focus of the strategy is the modernization of China's military and aims to transform US-led hegemony into a multi-polar order. Taking into consideration its economy, China would not establish confrontational relations with the US, but the strengthening of South Korea-US alliance and US-Japan alliance could only increase the security dilemma in East Asia.

To prevent the progress of the South Korea-US alliance into the South Korea-US-Japan tripartite alliance, a multi-lateral security cooperation based on cooperative security and comprehensive security must be established in East Asia. However, multi-lateral security cooperation in East Asia has a few essential limitations. First, there is no concept of East Asia for China and Japan, the major players in the region. Second, the human rights situation cannot be ignored if the concept of comprehensive security is to be introduced. Third, China and North Korea would consider multi-lateral security cooperation as threats to the dismantling of their systems. This is the precept received from the experiences of European countries.

3. From South Korea-US Alliance to a Peace Structure on the Korean Peninsula

If the military networking of South Korea-US alliance and the US aggressiveness on North Korea continue, then the formation of a peace structure on the Korean peninsula would become difficult.

The establishment of a peace structure on the Korean Peninsula must start with the abandonment of the North Korean nuclear program and the US guarantee on the North Korea system. The US needs to come up with a

strategy to the play the role of stabilizer or balancer within the Korean Peninsula and to carry out a policy of non-intervention - to normalize US-North Korean relations, leading to arms control of both South and North Korea and the gradual withdrawal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula.

If the US provides a security umbrella to implement a structure for the co-existence of South and North Korea in a loose confederation and not 'reunification by absorption' and if it plays the role of a balancer, controlling North Korean or South Korean aggression, the establishment of a peace structure is possible on the Korean Peninsula.  

Furthermore, awareness of the dangers of ultra-nationalism of the militarily- and commercially-privileged forces in Washington and Seoul as well as the conservatives in North Korea must be realized, as this factor could throw the Korean Peninsula into a crisis. That is, the dismantling process of the dark alliance is the process of peace-making on the Korean Peninsula. In addition, the South Korea-US military alliance is internally subordinated to the US, subordination freely given by former power forces. This subordination is cemented in several structural levels. However, the root of subordination lies more in the mind-set of the government, press, intelligentsia and the people over the supposed importance of an alliance with the US, rather than in the alliance system per se or the physical and structural levels of an unequal relationship.  

Therefore, the intervention for dismantling the South Korea-US alliance is important and this could be done through the solidarity of the South Korean civil society with the civil society in other East Asian countries. East Asia must be re-discovered as a new space for action. Changing the historical

14 Selig Harrison, Korean End Games (Seoul: Sam-in, 2003).
structure of global politics in East Asia can only be possible with the intervention of the civil society.
Overcoming National Division on the Korean Peninsula & the Peace Movements

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I. Introduction

After the Korean War, with the exception of the Rhee Syngman regime, the official position of North and South Korea was ‘peaceful reunification’. The necessity of reunification through peaceful means was natural since the Korean Peninsula has experienced the pain of national division soon after liberation and the Korean War. ‘Peace’ and ‘reunification’ cannot be divided. The process of overcoming national division is through peaceful methods and not through war and this will eventually lead to true peace and the overcoming of national division.

However, due to the reality of national division, any reference to the true meaning of peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula is met with controversy and reprisals. Cho Bong-am, the head of the Progressive Party who was sentenced to death in 1956 by Rhee Syngman, for proposing...
peaceful reunification, and although there are differences, any mention of reunification is still considered fateful.

The problems on the Korean Peninsula are related to the tension and mutual dependence of the governments under the structure of national division existing in South and North Korea, the interests and tensions of the US and neighboring countries, and the tension within the South Korean civil society accustomed to the Cold War. The developments in intra-Korean relations in the aftermath of the June 15 Summit Meeting and the changes in the political environment of the neighboring countries due to the aggravation of tensions in US-North Korean relations over the North Korean nuclear issue, have appeared with turbulence and realism to affect the political climate in the region. Also, the subjective awakening of the South Korean society and the strength of solidarity of peace and reunification are growing rapidly but the shadows of a society under 50 years' of national division are not likely to be lifted easily.

II. The Peace & Reunification Movements of the 1980s

After Cho Bong-am's proposal for peace and reunification, intermittent movements of peace and reunification and the theory of neutral reunification were carried out after the April 19 Revolution in the 1960s. Mass reunification movements only emerged after 1988 with the proposal for the North-South Korea Student Summit suggested by Jeondaehyup (the umbrella body for the student movement). Although the North Korean visit by Reverend Moon, Ik-hwan and university student Im, Su-kyung in 1989 were punished under the National Security Law, a fossil of the Cold War within South Korea, these events became the catalyst for activating the
reunification movement and raised heated debates over the necessity and direction of the reunification movement.

The reunification movements in the 1980s can be defined as `national liberation reunification.' This movement focused on the `pan-national rally' between North-South Korea and called for `autonomous exchange events'. It was a three-party meeting of South and North Koreans as well as overseas Koreans in efforts to discuss national unity and political cooperation. The US and the South Korea government were defined as anti-reunification forces.

The anti-US-autonomy-reunification movement highlighted the existence of the US on the Korean Peninsula, which has been prohibited for the past 50 years and directly countered against the anti-Communist-anti-North Korean ideology. These struggles were successful in restoring to the public the trends of resistant nationalism prohibited for since national liberation. The demands of `anti-US, anti-war, anti-nuclear'; movements of `getting to know North Korea properly'; autonomous exchanges and national grand unity; prospects for the co-existence of North-South Korea in a confederation; etc, were all very drastic demands at that time. These issues have been dormant despite liberation from Japanese rule in 1945 due to the formation of separate governments in 1948 and the subsequent failure to form a single government because of the breakout of the Korean War in 1950. After the war, these issues were submerged under an anti-Communist system. Although these demands were crude, they were meaningful because they brought to public mind the importance of these important spheres that had existed as a vacuum in the South Korean social movements.

However, belated rise in these movements of `anti-imperialist nationalism' and `national liberation reunification' "reflected the unique historical period of the national division on the Korean Peninsula" and had both limitations and problems.
First, the over-emphasis on national disparity had clouded the critical perspective of the structure of national division which has been in existence for the past 50 years. As such, all the problems were linked to ‘the US’, focusing on ‘anti-imperialism’ and ‘national unity’ and emphasizing ‘national-centeredness’ so much so that the problems on the Korean Peninsula were losing links with ‘other races, other countries, the world and other universal problems.”

Second, vague references to ‘national grand unity’ and emphasis on territory, blood ties, etc, i.e., ‘one nation’, started to emerge. Accordingly, the labor movement, environmental movement and other diverse South Korean social movements did not have a common link with the reunification movement and separated into specific movements while the youth and religious movements were reduced.

Third, the drastic emphasis on national disparity led to astonishment at the relative legitimacy of the North Korea regime in the early stages and this raised non-critical attitudes and unilateral support for North Korean policies. These attitudes ignored the universal standards (such as human rights and peace) to be applied to understand North Korea or the progress of the reunification movement.

The three-party solidarity movement, the most representative of the reunification movements had the tendency to support the North Korean regime (non-civilian) politically. There is no differences in opinion in the fact that the cooperation of the civilians of North and South Korea and overseas, and not the governments, are necessary for the reunification movement. However, the three-party solidarity movement supported the North Korea reunification model, opposed the mutual recognition of UN entry and tried to form an irrational political union. It was not taken into consideration that the civilian groups from North Korea participating in the
three-party solidarity movement were all semi-governmental organizations and that no other independent civilian organization existed.

III. Impetus for Change

The limitations of the reunification movement from the end of the 1980s to mid-1990s were internal but the limitations of objective conditions and the political trends cannot be ignored. The impetus for the development and specialization of the reunification movement came from the struggles of the social movements against political changes.

1. The North Korean crisis

The North Korean economic crisis was predestined with the collapse of the structure of state socialism in 1989. However, the seriousness of the food crisis was predicted beforehand. Famine and deaths from starvation were thought of as things happening in countries far away and to the South Korean society; North Korea's food scarcity came as a big shock.

North Korean economic crisis and famine came as a shock to South Koreans but this also became a turning point in the awareness of South Koreans on North Korea. This was the conviction that the South Korean structure was indeed more superior and this was accompanied by the lessening of wariness and enmity against North Korea. Until that time, North Korea was ‘a Communist country to be regarded as an enemy’ but became a ‘country in need of relief aid’. South Korea had to consider giving humanitarian aid to a country once regarded as an enemy.

On the other hand, it became necessary for the peace and reunification movement to have a more realistic awareness of North Korea. It was clear
that the North Korean crisis could not be resolved on the basis of one nation’ or humanitarian aid alone and that it was a structural problem. In whatever forms, it was clear that the North Korean structure was demanding internal reform. The problem of North Korean escapees who crossed the North Korean border with China in search of food became an issue and because of the strong actions taken by North Korea, this has become a human rights issue as well.

2. The Kim Dae-jung government and Engagement Policy

The change in the South Korean government at the end of 1997 brought new impetus for intra-Korean relations and the reunification movement. The Kim Dae-jung government pursued an engagement policy called ‘Sunshine Policy’ on North Korea. As such, the 2000 North-South Korea Summit was an important change in the fifty years’ of national division and was evaluated as an important historic event.

With the June 15 Declaration, it was difficult for the reunification movement to label the South Korea regime as being ‘an anti-reunification regime’. In the same way, the three-party solidarity forces which had been targets for suppression were safeguarded by the two governments to a certain extent ‘within the range of management’. The August 15 pan-national reunification festival was successfully carried out with the cooperation of the two governments. In South Korea it was an opportunity for the government and civilian groups to overcome the vicious cycle of exclusion and form relations of cooperation and restraint. However, the Sunshine Policy of the Kim Dae-jung government came under serious attacks from the conservative forces and the conservative press formed during the Cold War era. Internal tensions within South Korea were starting to emerge.
3. The Rise of the Bush Administration

The election of George W. Bush as the US President in 2000 became a factor for tensions on the Korean Peninsula. President Bush pursued militaristic and hegemonic foreign and security policies. The Bush Administration was critical of the policies of the previous Clinton Administration on North Korea and disapproved of South Korea's Sunshine Policy. All the comprehensive measures for improvements in relations agreed during the US visit of North Korea's Special Envoy Cho Myong-rok at the end of 2000, Secretary of State Albright's North Korean visit and considerations of the visit to the US by North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, came to nothing.

After September 11, President Bush undertook a new military interventionist strategy, the so-called 'pre-emptive strike security doctrine.' President Bush in his 2002 New year's Address to the nation, referred to Iraq, Iran and North Korea as 'the axes of evil' and claimed that “these countries cannot be left to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) which can be used to threaten our lives”, delineating the countries targeted for the second phase of the war against terrorism. In reality, the US has announced its suspicions over the North Korean enriched uranium program in October 2002, and declared frequently selective blockade and even the option of 'pre-emptive strikes' against the North Korean nuclear issue.

The emergence of the Bush Administration created serious problems in the smooth progress at normalizing North Korea-US and North Korea-Japan relations since the 2000 Summit and became an obstacle to the settlement of regional peace. The problem on the Korean Peninsula especially the military aspect, i.e., the structure of peace, which had been somewhat bypassed by the Sunshine Policy, now became a major issue in East Asia.
However, President Bush’s hegemonic policies of military intervention and the Iraqi War aroused a global anti-war and peace movement never seen in history. The South Korean civil society also faced a radical impetus for change. Critical public opinion against the Bush Administration’s attitude to the Sunshine Policy burst into the open in the candlelight Virgil following the death of two middle-school girls in 2002. This also influenced the election of President Roh, Moo-hyun (who was facing major difficulties in his campaign) to office and the Iraqi War also helped in the creation of the largest organization of ‘anti-war peace solidarity movement’ ever in history.

IV. Overcoming the Structure of National Division - the Diversification of the Peace Movement

With the growth of the forces within the civil society calling for democracy, peace, autonomy, and reunification in the midst of the turbulent political changes aforementioned, the mid-1990s to early 2000, saw the growth of a multi-faceted social movement.

1. The Movement to Aid North Korea

With the food crisis in North Korea in 1996, movements to help North Korea were proposed, encompassing all movements from the citizens’ to the peoples’ movements - the whole nation moved in a successful attempt to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea. However, opposition to providing humanitarian aid to North Korea was as strong within South Korea. A few politicians and the conservative press claimed that humanitarian aid to North Korea was just ‘sentimentalism’ and expressed concerns that the food provided could be used as military rations.
But the movement to aid North Korea was necessary from the aspect of war prevention on the Korean Peninsula and the reduction of economic burdens on South Korea in the case of the rapid collapse of North Korea. And with the possibility of securing and fostering the support of forces within North Korea who are opposing the North Korean system, the South Korean conservatives did not have much to base their opposition of North Korean humanitarian aid. Because of this, the foundations for wide-ranging solidarity did not lose strength. The movement to aid North Korea progressed from relief aid to development aid.

It is important to note here that, unlike the three-party solidarity, these movements joined forces directly with the North Korean authorities and the society. Through diverse methods of contact with North Korea, these people became civilian experts on the North Korean society and acted as multi-structured messengers between the North and South Korean governments and the civilian society, and started to establish themselves as rational mediators providing rational advice to the international society and as agents for resolving tensions.

2. The Emergence of the North Korean Human Rights Movement

In the past, the North Korean human rights issue was usually proposed by the government or government-sponsored organizations. This was part of the government's diversionary tactics to move away from the demands of the South Korean democratic movements on the reform of the internal human rights situation.

However, the North Korean human rights situation resurfaced again in the 1990s when cases of brutal arrests, forced imprisonment, public death sentencing, etc., of North Korean escapees on the hands of the North Korean authorities became known. In the midst of growing criticism against the
closed and oppressive nature of the North Korean structure, the human rights issue re-emerged. This situation underwent a drastic turn and while the South Korean government was taking a cautious attitude to the issue in consideration of intra-Korean relations and relations with neighboring countries, the conservative press and a part of the civil movement were taking an active interest in the issue.

The most representative North Korean democratic organization, the North Korean Human Rights' Citizens' Coalition, the North Korean Democratic Network, etc, claim that the fall of the North Korean regime is very important to the resolution of the North Korean human rights situation and international pressure is necessary for this to be possible. These groups support the US policy of military interventionism that grew out of September 11. They do not exclude war as a method for the resolution of the human rights situation. Regardless of their ideological background, these groups lack the qualities as a `peaceful mediator', one of the most important conditions for activists in the human rights movement.

Within South Korea, the peace and reunification movements and the human rights movements are divided over the issue of North Korean human rights: The position that denies the subjects of North Korea human rights and claim outside pressure as being inevitable to the resolution of the situation; recognizing the subjects of North Korean human rights but claiming that the problem lies with the internal desire for reform of the North Korean people; proposing quiet diplomacy and step-by-step cautionary approach, considering that the US and other Western capitalist states are strengthening their military interventionist policy on the pretext of human rights; and urging improvements in the human rights condition but opposing blockades, partial aid or any kind of measure that aggravate the North Korean human rights situation. However, these are just classifications according to ideological awareness on the human rights situation and organizations which
have a concrete agenda based on these classifications are few and far between.

And as long as the North Korean leadership adheres to the ruling ideology and principles formed under the Cold War structure and rationalize the ‘human rights crisis’ as foreign threats to its rights of self-determination and survival, the North Korean human rights movement would be pre-destined to become a part of the movement to overcome the structure of national division. Recently, active discourse has been increasing within the social movement organizations on the direction of the movement for improving North Korea human rights.

3. The Spread of Anti-US Sentiments & the Candlelight Virgil

From the mid-1990s, with the movements for the eradication of crimes committed by US troops, and the redemption of damages caused by the Maehyangri Bombing range and movement to return the range to the local people, regional movements for the return of the US bases, the investigative movements into group massacre by US troops during the Korean War, etc, became common. These movements were not only anti-US in character but were also complex and comprised of the women’s movement, local citizens’ movement, movements to rectify the past, etc.

With the advent of the Bush Administration in 2000, public opposition to the negative intervention of the US with its hegemonic global strategy in the progress of intra-Korean relations, grew stronger and burst forth as a mass movement. The 2002 candlelight Virgil is an exemplary case of these trends. With the strengthening of the North-South Korean reconciliation trends, contradictions started to appear in the US plans on East Asia. This was confirmed during the South Korea-US Summit in 2001 when the two governments collided over differences in the engagement policy, the
problems of MD, etc. These political trends also led to the increase in strong anti-US sentiments among young people, aided by medium of the internet. The emergence of young people who were relatively freer from the Cold War ideology was compatible with the trends in North-South Korean reconciliation and maturity of democratic and reform-minded forces. More liberal and autonomous public awareness was formed in cyberspace and this can be viewed as a naturally occurring awareness against the US hegemonic attitudes.

The death of two middle school students in June 2002 evoked a national protest movement against the US military and the South Korean government for their insufficient response on the responsibility of the deaths of the two students. In December, a nationwide candlelight Virgil was held, organized spontaneously by netizens. This candlelight Virgil broke the belief that ‘the US’ was a ‘sacred ground’ and was replaced by self-confidence, calls for normal relations, opposition to unequal relations, and also contained ultra-nationalistic emotional prejudice.

4. The Spread of the Peace Movement & Anti-Iraqi War Peace Solidarity

From the mid-1990s, a few groups in the social movement felt that ‘anti-US-autonomy’ and ‘nationalism-autonomy’ had limitations in their application to the problems of the Korean Peninsula and started to expand their scope to include a peace discourse or the peace movement.

From the mid-1980s, groups such as the women’s and environmental groups started to research on ‘women and peace’, ‘environment and peace,’ ‘religious spirituality and peace,’ ‘human rights and peace,’ ‘minority people and peace,’ etc. This led to the linking of the peace movement with the...
women's movement, environmental movement, religious movement, education movement, i.e., the diversification of the movements. Reform movements against the diverse aspects of a state under national division, security state, and prosperity state also became active. The traditional investigative movement into suspicious deaths in the military grew into a more systematic human rights movement including the ‘movement by conscientious objectors to oppose military conscription and demand replacement service’ as a way of direct confrontation against the structure of national division, and the introduction of an enlistment system instead of conscription, etc. Curriculums on tolerance training instead of security education, conflict resolution, rectifying history, were produced and disseminated. Investigations into ‘massacres during wars’ and the ‘Sorry Vietnam’ efforts are some examples of such outgrowths of movements. All these efforts meant challenges against deeply rooted militarism and anti-Communism embedded in a nationally divided civil society.

Military reform movements including the monitoring of military spending and monitoring of weapons purchases also started to emerge. These spheres have been highlighted during cuts in military spending and on the level of mutual arms control. And when the international movement against anti-personnel land mines was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the military watch movement became infused with a new methodology and possibility as well as new awareness on the danger of inhumane weapons and for the first time, a countermeasures committee was formed to publicize the danger of landmines - a network to oppose the introduction of specific weapons. This increased the struggle by the civil society to counter specific weapons and called for the reform in the purchasing price of parts for local tanks, opposition against the introduction of attack helicopters, F-15K, and PAC3, and the anti-MD movement was also activated. And recently, efforts are
being carried out to systematically monitor military spending leading to the
preparation of policy on arms reduction.

Struggling against the side-effects of the globalization of capitalism, and
strengthened US militarism and the violence of unilateral foreign policy after
September 11, the anti-globalization, anti-war peace and solidarity
movement crossed borders and became very active. Opposition against the
Bush Administration ‘preventive war doctrine’, which was first applied
during the Iraqi War, grew heated all over the world.

The question facing the South Korean peace movement was how to
overcome the simple nationalistic sentiment and feelings of injury of the
candlelight Virgil and how these feelings can be guided into a universal
solidarity, and how to link the crisis on the Korean Peninsula that was
heightened during the Iraqi war with the intentions of a peaceful resolution
of the crisis. It was a testing ground for ‘assertive diplomacy’, ‘saying-what-
needs-to-be-said diplomacy’, and the East Asian peaceful foreign policy of
the Roh Moo-hyun Administration.

On this perspective, the anti-Iraqi war peace movement can be evaluated
as a partial success as well as a partial failure. The fact that the first ever
anti-war solidarity against a war outside the borders of the war zone had
continued as a mass movement, that labor unions carried out struggles
against the dispatch of troops, the ‘anti-war and peace group’ of National
Assemblmen who went against party policy and prevented the passage of
the troop dispatch bill twice, could all be seen as results of the movement.
Furthermore, the ‘anti-Iraqi war peace team’, the so-called ‘human shields’
who went directly into the field of battle, is an exemplary model of direct
action civil disobedience.

However, while the majority of the Korean people oppose the Iraqi War on
the grounds of being unethical, two-thirds of the population approve of the
dispatch of troops ‘for the national good.’ Many of the Korean people agreed
with President Roh’s appeal that “for the peace and economic stability of the Korean Peninsula, alliance with the US cannot be ignored and this pursuit of practical gains is the stark reality in the international community”. Warnings that participation in an unethic war of prevention goes not only against human rights and human nature but that it could have a boomerang effect, were not heeded. President Roh claimed that “our situation is special”, selecting pragmatism which relates to the regressive nature of nationalistic feelings of injury.

V. Issues of the Peace & Reunification Movement

During the 1994 North Korean withdrawal from the NPT and the so-called ‘sea of fire’ crisis, leading to a war situation on the Korean Peninsula, the South Korean social movements did not do much to counter the situation. We knew later that the US had even considered a pre-emptive strike on North Korea but did not adequately respond to the situation.

Compared to 1994, the democratic reform of the South Korean society has been partially realized and support by the people on external autonomy and North-South reconciliation, and the formation of a peace structure on the Korean Peninsula, have increased to a large extent. It is still dubious whether the South Korean government possess effective policy measures and vision to manage a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, and whether it has the leverage to implement the policy measures on the US, North Korea, and neighboring countries. Especially, a strong vision of President Roh concerning ‘the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue’, the restructuring of the South Korea-US alliance system, etc, cannot be found.

The ‘autonomous defense theory’ emphasized by the Roh Administration is, in reality, a ‘theory of arms increase’ based on the subordinated alliance
structure, rationalizes the aggressive restructuring of US troops in the East Asian region and contains the possibility of acting as a catalyst for an arms race in the region. It is doubtful whether the incorporation of the new Cold War structure can co-exist with peace and prosperity in East Asia.

The problem lies not only with the government but also within the tensions in South Korea, that is, the peace forces in South Korea are not sufficient enough to overcome the crisis and implement a peace structure.

1. Citizens’ peace doctrine to overcome the ‘theory of the North Korean threat’ and security dilemma is needed.

On issues of national security, the government frequently refers to the ‘North Korean threat’. Accordingly, a citizens’ peace doctrine on the principles and course of regional peace and the politics and security of the Korean Peninsula is needed.

More importantly, on political awareness and the concept of security, there must be a shift from ‘military security’ to ‘assertive peace.’ Without overcoming deterrence and exclusion of national security and military security, regional peace and the overcoming of national division cannot be possible. The monopolistic analysis of threats and secretiveness must be challenged and the opening of the military security sector must be pursued. ‘Absolute deterrence’, ‘absolute defense’, ‘main enemy’, etc, that is, the security concept of arms competition and mutual exclusion must be challenged. Confidence-building measures must take place through mutually dependent security; defense based on the concept of mutual sufficiency; leadership in arms control; and peace must be established based the exclusion of sophisticated weapons and arms control. Furthermore, a framework to guarantee multi-lateral peace must be considered on the principles of multi-lateral cooperation and harmony. Measures must be
prepared for the abandonment of the cease-fire structure on the Korean Peninsula, the signing of the peace treaty and subsequent restructuring of the alliance structure, especially the tripartite South Korean-US-Japan alliance structure under progress.

These plans must not end up in mere position papers or theoretical work. A framework for comprehensive dialogue of the civil society must be formed and continued so that the fruits of the dialogue could be accumulated as rational measures to be changed and planned as citizens’ peace measures. Also the governments, Congress, and the civil society must be lobbied in order to make efforts to spread or re-trim the measures so that these measures could create confidence and legitimacy.

Military security assurances and arms control are direct measures for guaranteeing peace and the indirect but effective measures are economic cooperation and humanitarian aid. This would resolve the survival problems of North Koreans, in the least, and also his effective in inducing structural reform. Thus, the civilian peace plan must be based on economic cooperation and the separation of politics and the economy, and must include humanitarian aid without any conditions attached.

2. The Need for International Solidarity to Resolve Peace & Nuclear Problems on the Korean Peninsula

What is most important at the present stage on the Korean Peninsula is the formation of peace and solidarity. International peace solidarity comprising of the North and South Korean governments, civilians, and overseas Koreans are needed to resolve the issues on the Korean Peninsula. The international anti-war peace movements so active since the Iraqi War must be linked to the peaceful resolution of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula formed by the North Korean nuclear issue.
On this note, the universal aspect of the North Korean nuclear or the crisis on the Korean Peninsula must be emphasized rather than the nationalistic aspect. Based on this, the dispatch of troops to Iraq would prove detrimental to the security of the Korean Peninsula. Any appeals to the international community for the creation of peace on the Korean Peninsula would lose all legitimacy. Therefore, the peace and reunification movement must go hand in hand with movement against troop dispatch to Iraq.

For the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issues, there must be harmony between the anti-nuclear peace movement and the anti-US, anti-war movement. The unilateralism and the unfairness of the US policy of blockade and related side effects, and the results of regional security and North Korean reform to be caused by the policies of peace and co-existence must be emphasized. The ‘globalization’ of the North Korean human rights issue must be dealt with flexibility. Any politicization of the human rights issue such as human rights for blockade or human rights for war must be strictly opposed and appeals for peace on the Korean Peninsula and reform on North Korea human rights must be separately countered.

But compared to Iraq, the international community knows little about South Korea and we, too, are not used to international actions. It could be the language barrier but to be confined within the constraints of nationalism is not wise. The peace and reunification movement must make efforts to make the problems of the Korean Peninsula be objective and universal in space and time.

Furthermore, methods of direct action by citizens are needed to make the Korean nation and the world participate for the settlement of peace on the Korean Peninsula. Candlelight Virgil, the three-step-one-bow rally for life and peace and direct actions by the ‘anti-Iraqi War peace team’ are all good examples of direct actions. The satihagra movement led by Gandhi is good
for social education purposes and is both a smooth and strong movement targeting the nucleus of the problem.

3. The Reform of the Cold War Politics is Necessary

From the late 1990s the movement for the reform of the National Security Law, the movement to restore honor to the democratic movement, and the movement to investigate suspicious deaths became very active and a movement started calling for the establishment of a National Human Rights Commission and with the exception of the movement against the National Security Law, all the movements bore fruit.

The movement to reform the press and the growth of a progressive netizen press weakened the leadership of the Cold War, ultra-rightist press and helped to eliminate barriers hindering the development of democratic, reform-oriented and autonomous peace. Such fruits of the movement were due to the efforts and growth of netizens who were free from the experiences of the Cold War era and this culminated in the election of President Roh Moo-hyun to office that called for the continuation of reform, succession of the engagement policies and an assertive foreign policy.

However, the reaction of the conservative forces is emerging as well. The City Hall rally by conservative Christian and ultra-rightist groups in response to the candlelight Virgil, the construction of an anti-Communist conservative netizen press, political North Korea human rights campaigns are some examples. The actions by conservatives are a reflection of the ‘internalization’ of political and social tensions within South Korea in line with political changes. The issue of overcoming national division and the reform of the North and South Korean civil society are becoming increasingly linked with each other.
In this context, two presidents who are more inducive to peace and reunification have been elected but the weaknesses of the democratic and peace forces within the South Korea society cannot be ignored. The slowing down of political reform, chronic corruption, and the monopoly of regional structures by conservatives, are serious problems. Democratic reforms and peaceful co-existence policies are important internal investments for the peace and reunification of the Korean Peninsula peace. The attritional political culture which uses the Cold War and political tactics as leverage, must be reformed. Policy measures must not be in collusion with political corruption and the capitalists. The opposition party criticized the Sunshine Policy under the Kim Dae-jung Administration for the sake of criticism. The Sunshine Policy was used by the ruling party as pretext for the accumulation of astronomical amounts of political slush funds. For the settlement of peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula, political reform is a must.

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The Activities of the Center for Peace and Disarmament

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The Korean Peninsula is experiencing an important transition in the midst of the great turbulence of war and anti-war, tensions and peace. The situation calls for sensible strategies and the wisdom of the civil society in countering the tensions between the US and North Korea over the North Korean nuclear issue, the problems of the South Korean-US military alliance, and the dispatch of troops to Iraq. Faced with such conditions, PSPD intends to carry out the following objectives in efforts to create a new model in the peace and disarmament movement.

The activities of the Center for Peace and Disarmament would be undertaken in three major directions:

**Criticizing Policy & Proposing Countermeasures Related to Peace on the Korean Peninsula & East Asia**

The most pressing issue is the US-North Korea tension surrounding the North Korea nuclear program and the subsequent crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Critical analysis of government policies on this issue will be made and efforts will be made to propose a citizens’ peace plan. In the long run, the cease-fire structure, which causes a systematic occurrence of a crisis
on the Korean peninsula, must be abandoned and a movement for the settlement of a structure of peace must be launched. This movement cannot but join hands with the movement for the restructuring of the South Korean-US military alliance. Measures will be put forward to counter the issues that emphasize a non-rational alliance instead of an alliance protecting the safety and survival of the people on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, common citizen actions will be undertaken to counter US hegemony and the problem of US troops.

Monitoring Military Policy

The peace and disarmament movement is basically the realization of disarmament and change from security-oriented to non-security-oriented strategies. Unless state security or military security focusing on deterrence and exclusion is abandoned, the Cold War structure cannot be overcome and peace settled on the Korean Peninsula. To replace military security ideology with a peace ideology, the Defense White Paper must be countered with the regular publication of the Citizens' Peace White Paper. The Center for Peace and Disarmament intends to expand civilian watch over the spheres of defense and security which has been a `sacred ground'. Issues will be raised regarding bad policy decisions and exaggerated security ideology related to increases in defense spending, the introduction of weapons and on arms increases with demands that the relevant information to be released to the public. Also, all possible steps on defense policy that can be enforced would be considered and measures to be proposed.

Civilian education & Solidarity for International Peace
The peace movement equals solidarity. However, in the South Korean civil society movements, the discourse on peace and the peace movement have not become systematic and do not have a basis. The short experience and weakness in the peace movement are barriers in making the issues of the Korean Peninsula to become major issues in the international community. Accordingly, participation in the international peace movement and strategies and actions for the solidarity networking in urgently needed for ‘globalization’ of issues of the Korean Peninsula.

The Center for Peace and Disarmament aims to create a network of the peace movements inside and outside South Korea and to concentrate on the realization of anti-war, peace and international solidarity. Ties with the civilian movements of the US and Japan will be strengthened in a global solidarity network for East Asian peace, and this will be further expanded with ties of solidarity with other Asian and European solidarity networks. The Center for Peace and Disarmament also intends to concentrate on the development and dissemination of a peace paradigm to be based on the peace leadership of the South Korean civil society. Peace education will be opened to activists and researchers in efforts to overcome the root of peace issues and military security-centered security ideology and a new peace movement will be pursued to accomplish these goals. This education must be expanded into a movement for civilian education on peace issues. The development of peace education materials will be another important sphere of activity.